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WAR AND FAMINE IN SUDAN

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
AFRICAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED FIRST CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 23, 1989

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WAR AND FAMINE IN SUDAN

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1989

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 2:06 p.m., in room SD-219, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Paul Simon (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Simon, Kassebaum, and Humphrey.

Senator SIMON. The subcommittee hearing will come to order.

The people of Sudan face a massive problem, a problem of overwhelming proportions.

Last year, an estimated 200,000 to 500,000 people died. An additional 3 million, including a lot of orphaned children, have just been wandering around. Some of them end up in refugee camps in Ethiopia. There are about a million and a half near the capital of Khartoum, who are just on the edge of starvation, in addition to being on the edge of the city.

Part of the problem is the 30-year-old civil conflict in the Sudan.

Wherever these conflicts exist, reconciliation is extremely important. Today, several of us have introduced a resolution in the Senate urging reconciliation.

I would add that I would urge this, not only in the Sudan, but in Angola, in Mozambique, in other areas of conflict in Africa.

Secretary of State James Baker issued a statement on February 8 that I applaud. He says, although "many Sudanese and expatriates are laboring tirelessly to ensure food deliveries, and the cooperation with these efforts by both the Sudanese Government and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army has improved in recent months * * * much more needs to be done."

He called for the removal of obstacles to food delivery and said that the United States will do all that it can to support these efforts.

The question is how we can move vigorously. In 5 weeks from now, you are going to have rains in the Sudan. That is going to make food delivery much more important.

These are the specific questions that we are looking at. What specific actions will we take and should we take? What is our plan for enlisting private relief agencies to get food to rebel-held territories? How will we coordinate with private voluntary organizations and other international donors? How can we encourage the Sudanese Government and the SPLA to remove obstacles to food delivery?

Former Sudanese Ambassador to the United States and the former, I believe his title was Foreign Minister, Francis Deng, who, I have to add is one of the most impressive public officials I have met in any country, said in a recent article, "While we and our friends must all work for peace with a sense of urgency, the international community should spare no time or effort in bringing immediate relief to the starving masses. To be silent or equivocal about a human tragedy of such magnitude would not only add an international dimension to the national vacuum of moral leadership, but would indeed be a shortsighted diplomatic miscalculation. To quote words I used some 16 years ago under similar but less tragic circumstances, 'It is not the dead who suffer; it is those who cause their death and those who watch them die.' "

We are pleased to have as our first witness a Member of the House of Representatives, who lives right next to Washington, DC, Congressman Frank Wolf.

We are very pleased to have you with us today.

[The prepared statement of Senator Simon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR SIMON

The people of Sudan face a tragedy of overwhelming proportions. Last year an estimated 200,000 to 500,000 people died in Sudan of starvation. An additional 3 million—including orphaned children—have wandered in search of food, many to border refugee camps in neighboring Ethiopia. And literally 1.5 million southerners starve on the outskirts of Sudan's capital, Khartoum. The Sudanese people have become pawns in a 30-year-old civil conflict between the dominant Arab Muslim north and the African Christian and animist south. Both sides have used food as a weapon against the other, preventing food from reaching territory held by the other side. Millions of innocent people are caught in the fatal crossfire.

Many of us are disappointed by the long silence and failure on the part of the last administration to address this problem vigorously by taking effective action on food relief and movement toward a cease-fire. Secretary of State James Baker's February 8, 1989, statement is a welcome relief. He has indicated that although "many Sudanese and expatriates are laboring tirelessly to ensure food deliveries, and the cooperation with these efforts by both the Sudanese Government and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) has improved in recent months * * * much more needs to be done." Removing the obstacles to food delivery is critical and Secretary Baker has said that "the United States will do all it can to support these efforts."

We are here today to determine how the United States can move vigorously on food relief. In 5 weeks, the rains will begin in Sudan. We need to move quickly before food transportation becomes more difficult. What specific actions will we take? And how will we get food relief operations into high gear? What is our plan for enlisting private relief agencies to get food to rebel-held territories? How will we coordinate with private voluntary organizations and other international donors? How can we encourage the Sudanese Government and the SPLA to remove obstacles to food delivery?

And we will hear from several of the many people who have recently been to Sudan and witnessed the suffering and magnitude of devastation. We want to discuss the needs and strategies for addressing those needs.

Today, Senators Kennedy, Simpson, and I, along with colleagues from the House are introducing a resolution on the situation in Sudan which, among other things, urges "the President and the Secretary of State to exercise vigorous international leadership in pressing for a genuine national reconciliation and an end to wide scale starvation and suffering in Sudan, through forceful direct representations to the Government of Sudan and the SPLA, through sustained multilateral, diplomatic initiatives and active United States-Soviet collaborations, and through the designation of a special United States Government envoy." We also urge a review of United States-Sudan relations, including an examination of our bilateral and multilateral aid to Sudan, if the Sudanese Government fails within 6 months to make progress on food relief and on negotiations with the SPLA toward a cease-fire.

Former Sudanese Ambassador to the United States Francis M. Deng said in a recent article, "While we and our friends must all work for peace with a sense of urgency, the international community should spare no time or effort in bringing immediate relief to the staving masses. To be silent or equivocal about a human tragedy of such magnitude would not only add an international dimension to the national vacuum of moral leadership but would indeed be a shortsighted diplomatic miscalculation. To quote words I used some 16 years ago under similar but less tragic circumstances, 'It is not the dead who suffer, it is those who cause their death and those who watch them die.' "

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. WOLF, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM VIRGINIA

Mr. **Wolf**. Thank you very much, Senator.

I appreciate this opportunity. I want to personally thank you and the committee for scheduling these hearings on this very important issue.

Before I deliver my statement I'd like to note it is interesting that there are not any TV cameras here. There is very little media interest in this matter.

Yet, in Soviet Armenia, which was a very difficult and a very bad situation, 50,000 people, perhaps 100,000 died, and the outcry on the part of the Western World and the Eastern World was unbelievable.

Tom Brokaw of NBC went to Soviet Armenia to broadcast from there. Nobody is going to Sudan, and yet, 500,000 people—and possibly as many as a million—died. Still it doesn't seem that anybody is listening.

This is a difficult area for the media to get into, but in Ethiopia, a BBC camera crew went on a World Vision aircraft and filmed the tragedy so the world could see. It literally saved hundreds of thousands of lives.

In Sudan, but for a few of the written media, nobody seems to care.

So again, I am very appreciative and want to commend you and to thank you publicly and privately for seizing the initiative and acting quickly. Perhaps with the Senate holding hearings, it will encourage more people to become interested in Sudan.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to testify here this afternoon. As you know, in January, I traveled to northern and southern Sudan, as well as Ethiopia, in order to gain a full understanding of how famine conditions there were affecting that country.

The images I saw were the same images that haunted millions of Americans during the Ethiopian famine in 1985.

As an aside, I went to Ethiopia in December 1984. I was the first Member to go and live in the refugee camps, and, literally, the conditions were about the same as I saw in Sudan.

The two situations differ, however, in an important way. The tragedy in Sudan is caused by civil war and the use of food as a weapon by opposing sides. The Ethiopian famine was the result of a natural phenomenon.

With the chairman's permission, rather than using the committee's time to recite what I saw in Sudan, I would like to insert in the record a report I prepared, which details my observations.

Senator **Simon**. That will be entered into the record.

Mr. **Wolf**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The information referred to follows:]

SUDAN OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(by Congressman Frank R. Wolf—Jan. 30, 1989)

In Soviet Armenia, between 50,000 and 100,000 people died in early December as a result of a tragic earthquake. Nearly constant television and newspaper coverage moved people throughout the world who contributed time, money, and resources to help those who were suffering. This was an appropriate response that reflected compassion and understanding.

In Sudan in Africa, some 500,000 (and perhaps as many as 1 million) people, the equivalent of the entire population of Pittsburgh plus 75,000 more, died during 1988 as a result of famine fueled by civil war between the Moslem north and the mostly Christian or animist south. Despite the massive suffering occurring in Sudan, few news stories have captured the public's attention and the situation continues to worsen.

During the first week of January I traveled to Sudan, Ethiopia, and Kenya to obtain a comprehensive view of this situation. No Member of Congress had previously traveled to rebel-held territory in southern Sudan and I was the first Member of Congress to visit any part of Sudan in nearly 3 years.

In the camps that I visited in northern and southern Sudan and on the Ethiopia-Sudan border, I found many of the same images that haunted millions of Americans during the Ethiopian famine in 1985. The two differ, however. The tragedy in Sudan is caused by civil war and opposing sides use food as a weapon. The Ethiopian famine was the result of natural phenomena.

OBSERVATIONS

I viewed the situation in Sudan from three viewpoints: The refugee situation in northern Sudan and in southern Sudan and the situation in refugee camps in Ethiopia along the Sudan border.

Southern Sudan.—The situation in southern Sudan, an area held mostly by rebel troops of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), is potentially critical.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations, private relief organizations, the United States and other Western nations have provided a large amount of food and medical supplies to northern Sudan. Little of these supplies, however, have reached the south.

The population of southern Sudan is approximately 7 million of which some 250,000 died in 1988. Little more is known about the number of displaced people or the food situation in this region.

Few relief organizations are operating in the south and beyond these limited efforts, little aid is reaching the south. Several relief experts in Sudan told me that it is likely that there are large pockets in this region where little or no food is available.

I traveled with the Norwegian People's Aid (NAP) to Kapoeta in southern Sudan to observe relief operations there. There are an estimated 30,000 refugees in camps scattered around Kapoeta. These residents have come from miles around, many walking for weeks and even months to reach food and shelter. The NPA is providing food, medicine, and supplies.

Surprisingly, starvation and malnutrition were not widespread in the southern areas relief agencies have reached. I was told, however, that this was not an encouraging sign because it meant that most of the starving people had either died or were attempting to reach feeding camps in the north or in western Ethiopia.

Most importantly, however, relief experts are concerned that 250,000 or more southerners (the entire population of Richmond, VA, plus many thousand more) could die in the next year if the rainy season arrives in April without adequate arrangements in place to provide food to the affected areas. Rain will make roads, already in poor condition, nearly impassable and will make dirt airstrips unusable. The weakened condition of those who survived the famine this year could exacerbate the tragedy next year.

ETHIOPIA

In Ethiopia I visited Fugnido Camp, one of four refugee camps located near the Sudan border outside the town of Gambela. Hundreds of thousands of Sudanese have trekked from Sudan to these refugee camps in search of food and shelter and respite from the war. It is sadly ironic that the situation in Sudan is so desperate that people will flee to Ethiopia for relief.

The flow of refugees into Ethiopia began in November 1987 and the first arrivals were described as walking skeletons. Since that time the United Nations High Commission for Relief has operated camps to offer assistance.

The case of 9-year-old Mayen-Mayen Diye was typical of those I encountered at Fugnido. Mayen and others in his village were attacked by a government armed militia in Aweil. His family had been killed. After the attack, he found himself with about 90 other young boys in the woods. Together with their cattle they walked for 5 months in search of food and shelter. Of the approximately 90 that began the journey, only about 25 survived it.

The trail that Mayen followed has become known as the Trail of Corpses because of the large number of Sudanese who died along that route seeking food and shelter. It is said that many refugees located the camps by following the trail of bones.

While the flow of refugees into the camps in Ethiopia has temporarily slowed, Sudanese are still arriving daily, often in poor physical condition ravaged by disease and hunger.

The camp I visited maintained a poorly equipped medical facility for the most seriously malnourished and operated a supplemental feeding program for those who were less seriously malnourished.

The UNHCR has projected a refugee population in the Ethiopia camps of about 320,000. That figure has nearly been reached. As a result, if conditions in Sudan again worsen, as most experts predict they will, and the flow of refugees increases, it is unlikely that the camps in Ethiopia will be able to adequately handle the increased demand.

Northern Sudan.—In northern Sudan there are refugee camps in and around Khartoum serving a refugee population of about 1 million. In addition, camps have been established along major refugee routes throughout the north to help take the pressure off camps in Khartoum. The camps contain an estimated 228,500 refugees.

Northern Camps.—I viewed several camps in Kosti, a 4-hour drive from Khartoum. In Kosti, there are an estimated 65,000 displaced persons, primarily women and children who have fled from the war areas of the south in search of food and shelter.

Combo Camp, home to approximately 20,000 Sudanese, was typical of the camps I saw. On the day I visited, 32 new people had arrived from camps further south. One woman said she had walked for 5 days from a camp further south to reach Combo. Layia Camp, which I also visited, is home to approximately 10,000 Sudanese.

These camps, and others like them, have been established along the refugee route from the south to help take pressure off the already overcrowded camps in Khartoum. In all there are an estimated 228,500 displaced persons in northern regions outside Khartoum and this figure is expected to increase to 330,000 by 1990.

Living conditions in the camps are poor. Relief workers said disease was widespread as was malnutrition. As little as 2 months ago, hundreds were dying from malnutrition. Food is reaching most of these camps now.

Khartoum Camps.—In and around Khartoum there are an estimated 1 million displaced persons. This figure is expected to reach 1.25 million by 1990. As with the camps in Kosti, living conditions are very poor and disease is prevalent. One camp was actually built on top of a city dump. Water is in short supply and housing is cramped and in poor condition.

One AID official told me privately that while there is food reaching the camps, malnutrition levels may still be as high as 25 to 30 percent because of logistical difficulties in feeding 1 million people every day. This problem will only increase as the number of refugees increase. The results could be even more tragic, however, if food shortages develop.

Khartoum Government.—The Government of Sudan has not been particularly cooperative in reaching a solution to this tragic situation in the north.

Several private relief organizations were expelled from northern Sudan including World Vision, Lutheran World Federation, and others. No official explanation has been given for these expulsions.

Private relief organizations I met with in Khartoum all expressed concern that it is becoming more difficult for private voluntary organizations (PVO's) to operate in Sudan. Annual registration, operating licenses, and arbitrary rules have made compliance difficult. One PVO representative told me that if a group gets on the wrong side of any level of government, they could easily be kicked out of the country.

The Sudanese military has armed militias which have been regularly attacking southern Sudanese. These militias, completely independent of military control except for their weapons, are regularly cited by displaced persons for attacks on their families and villages.

The Sudanese Government has in many cases prevented food from reaching southern regions arguing that this only provides the enemy with strength to fight. I saw barges loaded with food in Kosti destined for Malakal, a devastated area in the south, which have sat in port for several months because the government has not made arrangements for an escort up the Nile River. Without an escort, the barges would undoubtedly be attacked by either the rebels or even the government army.

A report in the Daily Telegram (London) on January 12 said that at least four were dying daily in Malakal and that approximately 6,000 had died in the Bahar al Ghazal and Equatoria regions during the preceding 3 weeks.

Sudanese People's Liberation Army.—The Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA)is also not without fault.

On a number of occasions the SPLA has attacked convoys carrying desperately needed food and medicine. The SPLA has argued that these convoys were carrying primarily military supplies for use in the war. The government has responded that a military escort is necessary when transporting food through a war zone.

The SPLA has also been reluctant to allow relief organizations to enter southern Sudan. As has been noted, only the ICRC and the NPA have accessed the south and vast regions have yet to be explored. One relief organization told me that it was as difficult dealing with the SPLA as with the Government of Sudan.

In late December a private relief plane crashed in southern Sudan. While the cause of the crash is uncertain, some believe the plane may have been shot down by the SPLA. In fairness, however, a substantial number believe that poor weather conditions were the main cause of the crash.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on my observations during the trip, the following are my recommendations to help relieve the suffering of the people of Sudan:

1. *Public statement.*—The U.S. Government should make a statement, from the highest level, urging that a cease-fire and open roads agreement be reached immediately. Only with a cease-fire and open roads can food be delivered safely to both the north and south.

There is perhaps a unique opportunity now with the new administration taking office. President Bush was well thought of by nearly everyone I met and spoke with in east Africa. The Sudanese were especially appreciative of then Vice President Bush's visit to Sudan in 1985.

Strong condemnation of the war by the Bush administration and public statements urging a cease-fire could be helpful.

2. *Role of the Soviet Union.*—Recognizing the Soviet Union's relationship with Ethiopia (the Soviet Union provides Ethiopia with a significant amount of aid) and Ethiopia's relationship with the SPLA (Ethiopia is the base for SPLA operations), the United States Government should ask the Soviet Union to urge the SPLA to reach a cease-fire agreement with the Government of Sudan.

3. *AID coordination.*—The Sudan problem really involves three countries: Sudan, Ethiopia (location of over 300,000 Sudanese refugees), and Kenya (base for private relief efforts into southern Sudan). As a result, coordination between U.S. AID personnel at each of the three posts is essential.

AID personnel in each of the three posts are doing an outstanding job in addressing the vast problems they have encountered. To ensure that efforts between the three are conducted efficiently and to generate new and innovative approaches which might not be apparent to any one of the posts, perhaps one person should be designated by AID to coordinate Sudan relief efforts.

4. *Peace envoy.*—The famine in Sudan is the direct result of civil war. While attempts have been made at a peace accord, they have failed and the people of Sudan continue to suffer.

The United States should unconditionally express its desire that peace be reached and should designate an individual with a thorough understanding of Africa and its politics to negotiate between both sides in order to achieve a cease-fire and open roads policy that will allow food to reach all areas of Sudan.

The appointee, either a high-ranking Government official or esteemed private citizen, should report directly to the Secretary of State on his or her efforts.

This appointment should be made as quickly as possible so that the process can get underway before the rainy season brings more devastation in April.

The primary goal should be a cease-fire and open roads policy. An end to the war should be the long-term goal.

5. *Private relief organizations.*—The United States should specifically request that the Government of Sudan allow private relief organizations which were expelled from Sudan to return.

Further, the United States should explicitly state its support for private relief organizations and its desire that they be allowed to operate in Sudan without interference and without unnecessary redtape.

A similar message in support of private relief efforts should be sent to the Government of Ethiopia.

6. *Incentive for fair use of aid.*—The United States provides a significant amount of aid to Sudan each year. Sudan should be encouraged to use this aid to feed people in both the north and the south.

The Malakal barges are an example of the Sudanese Government failing to provide food to the south and this should not be tolerated.

Some incentive should be designed that will encourage both sides to allow food to reach all the people. For example, Peace Corps activities in Sudan could be resumed if food aid is fairly distributed.

The United States should not threaten to cut off food aid as this will only increase the suffering of the Sudanese people and would reduce the United States to using food as a weapon. In any event, Sudan would merely expect other relief organizations and nations to fill the void the United States would create.

7. *Chemical weapons.*—There have been allegations, so far unsubstantiated, that the Sudanese military have begun to use chemical weapons supplied by Libya or Iraq. The United States should thoroughly investigate the accuracy of these allegations.

If the allegations prove to be accurate, the United States should take all appropriate action to condemn the use of these weapons.

8. *Military alliance with Libya.*—Sudan has a growing military alliance with Libya, its neighbor to the northwest. Soviet Migs line the runway at Khartoum Airport and the SPLA claims to have captured two Migs and a Libyan pilot.

The United States should express its displeasure over this growing relationship.

Mr. WOLF. Suffice to say, the conditions I witnessed were terrible and the suffering immense.

The Bush administration has shown a deep sensitivity to the problems in Sudan.

When I briefed Secretary of State James Baker on my trip to Sudan just days after he was sworn in, he was well versed about the political and the relief situation. He quickly dealt with the problem by issuing a strong statement, calling for the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army to ensure that food reaches people in all parts of Sudan.

The statement also called for an early cease-fire to promote peace and allow relief to reach those in need.

Most recently, the United States has provided food and supplies for cross-border operations in the southern Sudan.

In response to the administration's actions, the Sudanese Embassy announced recently that some 2,800 tons of relief materials, not enough, but some, have been delivered to towns and in southern Sudan since January, and 61 barges loaded with relief supplies are en route to Malakal, an area deeply affected by the famine.

In addition, the Sudanese Government has indicated a willingness to seek peace. We are going to have to see how sincere they are. But there has been a positive statement on their part.

These are all very positive actions and have undoubtedly helped to relieve, but certainly not solve, the suffering of thousands of Sudanese and will undoubtedly save the lives of many thousands more in the coming year.

I believe the Bush administration has a unique opportunity to influence the peace process in Sudan. Peace is the one missing link that will eliminate the crisis in Sudan that threatens so many thousands of people.

With all the positive steps that have been taken thus far, a cease-fire agreement which opens the roads and allows the free passage of food in both northern and southern Sudan could be the step that ensures that there is little or no famine in Sudan in 1989, and well before the rainy season that you spoke about.

Hundreds of thousands of lives could be saved.

I recommended to the administration that the United States appoint an individual with a thorough knowledge and understanding of Africa and its politics, a peace envoy of sorts, to negotiate between both sides of the Sudanese conflict in order to achieve a cease-fire and open-roads policy that will allow food, medicine, and supplies to reach all parts of Sudan. Such an appointment would send a powerful message to the world and to the people of Sudan that the United States is committed to preventing a humanitarian disaster of the type that occurred in Sudan last year.

More importantly, it would provide the framework for the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army to begin to iron out their differences. This could only lead to improved conditions for all the people in Sudan.

I sensed, Mr. Chairman, during my visit, that the people of Sudan, from both the north and the south, are tired of the fighting. They are beginning to recognize that the war, which costs the Government of Sudan about $1 million a day, is the cause of many of the nation's problems—lack of water, lack of electricity, lack of food, lack of bread, and just the lack of anything that is really very important to a normal life.

Last, Mr. Chairman, I would recommend that the United States Government ask the Soviet Union to urge the SPLA to reach a cease-fire agreement with the Government of Sudan. The Soviet Union has a close relationship with Ethiopia, and Ethiopia serves as a base for SPLA activities. Soviet influence on the SPLA, combined with a constructive United States intervention in the form of a peace negotiator, could have a dramatic benefit in reaching a cease-fire accord in time to avoid the tragedy that will come from the rainy season.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, I believe very sincerely that the Bush administration has responded very quickly. I want particularly to commend Secretary Baker.

He was sworn in one night and the next day he met with me. I was impressed with his knowledge and his sincerity.

You know, in this business, you can tell when somebody is really interested or if they are just trying to give you the brushoff. He is sincerely interested.

I want to commend him and the Bush administration for forcefully, quickly, and effectively responding to the problems in Sudan.

The administration's efforts so far have undoubtedly saved many lives. The key, however, to a long-term solution is to have a cease-fire and then peace.

I want to thank you again for this opportunity.

Senator SIMON. I thank you.

If I could, I would just comment on a couple of things and ask one question.

First, I just want to commend you for your interest in that area of the world. Unfortunately, Africa just does not get the interest and attention from some of our colleagues that I think it merits. One of those who has shown an interest, I am pleased to say, is my colleague who just arrived, Senator Nancy Kassebaum.

Your point on media coverage is absolutely on target. It is the dramatic nature of what happened in Armenia that has caused our interest there. I applaud that interest, as do you.

Mr. WOLF. Yes.

Senator SIMON. But here there are many more lives at stake, though it is not some sudden, cataclysmic thing, dramatic thing, that caused the problem.

I would hope also, in line with your statement—I know a decision has been made on an Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. I would hope that the White House might speed up the process of that FBI clearance so that that person can be involved, not only in this Sudanese problem, but in some other problems.

The irony of the situation—and it has been some years since I have been to Sudan—but the irony is that Sudan should be a food exporter. It is one of the few nations in Africa that can be a food exporter.

What would be the possibility—and you were just there a matter of a few weeks ago—what would be the possibility if you, I, Senator Kassebaum, and a few others made an immediate appeal to both sides for a cease-fire, at least for the next 5 weeks, until the rainy season hits us, so that food can be delivered to people?

Is there any possibility that the two sides might agree to something like that?

Mr. WOLF. I clearly am not an expert here and want to preface with that. But my sense is that I think it would.

I might say to Senator Kassebaum that a lot of people there mention you. I think you were the last Member of Congress to have been in Sudan.

Senator SIMON. May I ask you, did they mention here favorably or unfavorably? [Laughter.]

Mr. WOLF. Very favorably.

The two people that were mentioned over and over were both you and also President Bush. President Bush had been there in 1985, and all the people mentioned that they met with him. They acted like he had talked to them all, that they were personal friends of his. It must have been a very large room.

He was also there in the 1970's. He may be the only President of the United States who has ever been in Sudan. I'm not sure. But they do appreciate very much, Senator, your being there.

I think it would make a big difference if you, Senator Kassebaum, and others in the Congress and the administration at the same time were to ask for a cease-fire. I think they would probably be very sympathetic.

The reason is their Minister of Defense, I just heard, has resigned. He resigned 3 days ago. The water is not working in Khartoum. The businessmen are beginning to realize that their lives are so miserable because of the war. There are bread lines there. There are demonstrations in the street. The streets aren't being taken care of. The electricity doesn't work. There has been no telephone service for over a year.

They are all getting fed up, whether Moslem of Christian, whatever party they are in.

So, I think that is a great idea, Senator, to ask that they have a cease-fire, a peace for 5, 6, or 7 weeks, to allow them to get the food in place. Then that would be in place when the rainy season comes.

Whether they would do it or not, I think they may. I certainly think it is worth a try.

Senator SIMON. It sounds like it would be worthwhile.

What I would like to do is have our staff this afternoon put together language for such a cablegram that we could send to both sides. We will check with Senator Kassebaum's office and your office and maybe get a few more of our colleagues to sign on and send that out.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I would like to say how pleased I am that you have called this hearing, and to say to you, Representative Wolf, how much I value and appreciate the fact that you took the trip in January and that you are leading off the testimony.

I knew that you had a very thoughtful trip. One just cannot help but be touched deeply by the tragedy taking place there and feel very frustrated on exactly what our role can be to be constructive and helpful.

I think by this discussion and by a focus on the problem, we may at least be taking some important first steps.

I just value the input you have had since you were there in already making a difference.

Mr. WOLF. Thank you very much.

Senator SIMON. We thank you very, very much.

Mr. WOLF. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate the opportunity.

Senator SIMON. We are grateful for your interest.

Next we will have a panel: Mr. Kenneth L. Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs from the Department of State. He will be accompanied by Jack Davison, the Director of the Office of East African Affairs at the State Department. Also we have Mr. Walter G. Bollinger, the Acting Assistant Administrator for the Bureau for Africa, of AID, and Ms. Julia Taft, the Director of the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance for AID.

We are very pleased to have you with us.

I would ask this. We will put your full statements in the record. I would ask that each of you limit your oral presentations to 5 minutes, so that we can move as rapidly as we can, and also get into some questions.

Mr. Brown, we'll call on you first.

STATEMENT OF KENNETH L. BROWN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; ACCOMPANIED BY, JOHN DAVISON, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EAST AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. BROWN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for inviting us to appear before you today to discuss the war and famine in Sudan.

At your request, I am submitting my written testimony for the record and will limit my oral remarks.

Senator SIMON. It will be entered into the record.

Mr. BROWN. I will lead off with a brief oral statement, reiterating U.S. Government views on the Horn, as set forth most recently, February 8, at the time that Secretary Baker issued the statement that has been referred to today.

I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your words of support for that statement, and also to express appreciation to Senator Kassebaum for her personal interest in this. She issued a statement right after the Secretary's statement in support of the Secretary's position. We very much appreciate that.

We would also ask you to convey our appreciation to Senator Kennedy as well for his statement.

Of course, we all owe a debt of gratitude to Congressman Wolf for the personal role that he has taken, to go there personally, in place, to see what has been going on.

At the time the Secretary issued his statement, he expressed our Government's profound concern about massive suffering in Sudan and called on both sides in the war, the Sudanese Government and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army, to do everything possible to provide relief to the victims of the war and to make peace their primary goal.

The United States believes that no issue is as urgent as providing food to the innocent victims of the conflict. But we recognize that the famine is the direct result of the war. The achievement of peace is the real answer to the suffering and human tragedy in Sudan. Hence, our central objective is to end the war.

The urgency for the United States is heightened by our long ties of friendship with Sudan, our support for its democratic institutions, and the importance of its stability for the region.

Our policy thus is centered on interrelated issues: Support for Sudanese democracy, a peaceful solution to the war, and relief for its victims.

Even without a war, any relief effort would be severely complicated by the vastness of the territory, the lack of infrastructure, inhospitable terrain, the activities of bandits, and the lack of reliable information on population concentrations and need.

But the war has been the dominant factor, and both sides have tended to place political and military considerations above the humanitarian.

Recently, increased cooperation by both sides has allowed progress on relief. For many months, the United States has been in the forefront of efforts to provide that relief.

My colleague, Mr. Bollinger, will provide further information on our relief activities.

The United States has also taken an active role in promoting a negotiated settlement. Intensive efforts throughout 1988, including those by the United States, unfortunately did not succeed in bringing Prime Minister Sadiq and SPLA leader John Garang together. But many contacts at other levels between the sides helped prepare the way for productive talks, which took place in Addis Ababa in November between Sudan's Democratic Unionist Party, the DUP, and SPLA representatives.

The DUP-SPLA proposal contained the key elements of compromise which would halt the fighting and permit both sides to join in a constitutional convention for discussion of the issues separating them and leading to a new constitution for Sudan.

Ethiopian support and sanctuary have been essential for the SPLA. The United States has taken the initiative in discussing Ethiopia's policies and role with the Soviet Union.

We will continue to seek an end to external interference in Sudan, as well as progress with the Soviets in pursuit of negotiated solutions to the region's problems.

The United States believes, however, that Sudan's civil war involves fundamental internal issues and legitimate southern grievances, which the Sudanese themselves must resolve.

Resolution of the issues should not be impossible. The major sticking point is over the application of Islamic law.

Sudan's parties are divided on the various issues involved. But no party has said it opposes discussion of Islamic law in the context of a constitutional convention of all Sudanese parties.

Despite the promise of the DUP-SPLA peace proposal, the government has not brought about agreement of the Constituent Assembly and the Cabinet, which could lead to implementation of the proposal. The United States supports all three fundamental elements of the peace proposal—a constitutional convention to bring the parties together; no preemptive moves to revise or implement Islamic laws pending convening of the conference; and a cease-fire demonstrating the goodwill of both sides to engage in productive talks.

Of these considerations, a cease-fire, which is necessary for getting relief to all those in need, is most urgent.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brown follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KENNETH L. BROWN

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to appear before this Subcommittee to discuss the current political climate in Sudan and developments related to peace. I would like to briefly outline U.S. interests in Sudan, the history of peace initiatives and what we have done to promote peace, and assess where peace prospects stand now. Mr. Bollinger will then discuss the status of relief efforts. We will do our best to answer any questions you might have.

Peace has been our main objective in Sudan for a number of years. It is a prerequisite to dealing effectively with Sudan's most critical problems: ending human suffering and rehabilitating the economy. An estimated one to two million Sudanese have been displaced by the civil war. Many of these continue to be at risk of starvation -- estimates of Sudanese deaths from starvation in 1988 alone range into the hundreds of thousands. Peace would also reduce the number of human rights violations; most are related to the war.

It is also clear that efforts at sustained economic rehabilitation will be futile until peace is restored. The Sudanese Government estimates the war directly costs it about $1 million a day. That does not include costs of relief efforts and services to the displaced population -- which numbers at least 1 million just in the Khartoum area -- or the cost of disruption of essential commodities, especially fuel, which are sporadically commandeered for the war effort. The war also prevents all but the most basic economic activity in the South, including completion of the Junglei Canal and the development of Chevron's oil field. In short, until the war ends, Sudan has no prospect of working toward a better economic future. With peace, in view of Sudan's agricultural potential and its highly developed human resource base, that future could still be realized.

Sudan is the largest country in Africa, bordered by nine countries in a region plagued with instability. It can influence the region's stability either in a positive or a negative sense. Not only Sudan would benefit from its political and economic stability; so would our other friends in the region such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Kenya. Continuation of current turmoil and war works to polarize Africa along racial and religious lines and serves the interests of adversaries of the U.S.

We support democracy in Sudan. But democracies can lack resolution and direction; Prime Minister Sadiq has just formed his third coalition since May 1987 and there is much divisiveness and maneuvering among the political parties in Khartoum. Hard decisions, including those related to peace, are often sidetracked. Nonetheless Sudan's democratic institutions deserve our support -- even if we do not agree with all of the government's policies and decisions.

Given the massive level of human suffering and inability to move forward on critical issues, Sudan was the focal point of high-level attention in the last administration and will certainly remain so now. President Bush has visited Sudan twice, the last time as Vice President in 1985, and met in Washington with senior Sudanese officials on nine occasions in his vice-Presidential capacity, including a meeting with Prime Minister Sadiq el Mahdi in 1986, a few months after Sadiq was elected. Secretary Shultz met with Sadiq in 1986 and with then Foreign Minister Abu Salih last October. Assistant Secretary Crocker has visited Sudan since Sadiq became Prime Minister and on numerous occasions has engaged in extensive conversations with senior Sudanese officials visiting

Washington. I have visited the Horn three times in the past 14 months, meeting with senior officials of both the Sudanese Government and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA -- the insurgent force.)

Sudan's high priority has been affirmed by the new Administration. As you are aware, on February 8 the Secretary issued a statement calling for an early ceasefire in Sudan and a background paper on prospects for peace and relief there. As before, we are attempting to promote peace and relief through a combination of private and public diplomacy. The Secretary's statement is the third public appeal we have made regarding Sudan since October.

Given the level of our attention to Sudan, obvious questions arise: what have we been doing to promote peace? Why haven't there been more results? What are the prospects for peace?

Let me briefly review the origin of the war and peace efforts to date. This civil war is the second since Sudan's independence in 1956. The first, which was also fought between Northern and Southern Sudanese over essentially the same issues of political and economic powersharing, national identity and religion, lasted from independence until 1972. The current conflict started in 1983 when then President Nimeiri attempted to diversify -- critics say dilute -- the political power of Southern Sudanese by dividing the South -- then one province -- into three provinces. He also instituted an Islamic legal code ("shari'a"), known as the 1983 September Laws, which was strongly opposed by Southerners as well as many Northern Sudanese. Nimeiri was ousted in April 1985 by a military government, the Transitional Military Command, or TMC, which promised to replace the September Laws with the previously existing secular legal code and to restore democracy.

Democracy was restored with Sadiq's election a year later but the TMC never revoked the September Laws, nor have any of the subsequent governments under Sadiq.

Efforts to end the civil war began in earnest under the TMC in March 1986, just before Sadiq was elected. Months of negotiation between an alliance of Sudanese political parties and the SPLA resulted in the Koka Dam agreement which established the blueprint for a peace process. The agreement called for (1) the abrogation of the September Laws, (2) an end to the state of emergency imposed by the TMC, (3) holding a constitutional conference, (4) adoption of the 1956 constitution as amended through 1974 (the previous secular constitution), (5) abrogation of foreign military agreements and (6) continuous efforts by both sides to work toward peace. The agreement was signed by the SPLA and by a number of political parties including Sadiq's Umma Party. But critically absent were representatives of the National Islamic Front (NIF) -- the Islamic Fundamentalists -- and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) -- Sudan's second largest party.

The Koka Dam agreement was heralded by both sides but became a dead letter. The Government established a Ministry of Peace in August 1986 with a mandate to find a solution to the war and organize a conference for a new constitution. The Ministry developed a large staff but failed to accomplish anything of substance before its dissolution late in 1988.

The U.S. has been active in trying to bring Khartoum and the SPLA to the negotiating table. We are willing to do more depending on the wishes of the two sides. There have been many other mediation attempts. Mediators and would-be mediators have included President Museveni of Uganda, President Mubarak of Egypt, Chairman Mengistu of Ethiopia, former Nigerian President Obasanjo working with Former Sudanese Foreign

Minister Francis Deng and even Colonel Qadhafi. In addition, Sudanese political parties and military figures have met with the SPLA informally to seek solutions. Even members of the present government in Khartoum have talked with the SPLA.

Some of the various initiatives have led to promising openings; most have been mishandled by one side or both. The SPLA has consistently failed to coordinate its military activity with peace initiatives. For example, in August 1986 shortly following promising discussions between Khartoum and the SPLA, the SPLA shot down a relief plane. Khartoum responded by cutting off contacts with the SPLA for a number of months. In November 1987, a Sadiq-Garang meeting was cancelled when the SPLA, with Ethiopian help, attacked and overran a Sudanese border town a week before the scheduled summit.

The Sudanese Government has also missed or avoided opportunities. It abandoned promising discussions between the Sudanese military and SPLA in November 1987. In 1988 the Government showed little interest in testing Garang's sincerity after he announced willingness in March to meet "unconditionally" with Sadiq. In contrast, it was quick to accept a U.S.-brokered summit meeting between Sadiq and Garang later in the year, only to see Garang fail to pursue that opportunity. Most recently, since last November, the Government has not vigorously pursued a promising ceasefire framework negotiated by the DUP and SPLA.

Despite the failures, there has been much positive movement over the past year or so. Khartoum has focussed more clearly on addressing Southern problems as the primary peace track. Over the past year much stronger lines of communication and understanding have been established between Khartoum and the SPLA; official emissaries have talked and are talking in a substantial way. Both sides also now focus more directly on the key issues which need resolution. The critical issues were distilled into the DUP/SPLA agreement: (1) suspending efforts to pass a new shari'a law code prior to a constitutional conference, (2) Khartoum's abrogation of military agreements with other countries (at SPLA's insistence), (3) lifting the State of Emergency Laws and implementing a ceasefire and, most importantly, (4) holding a constitutional conference.

This stepped-up level of contact and more concentrated focus on the issues does not necessarily portend a quick breakthrough. Despite the dialogue, both sides continue to harbor deep suspicions. The SPLA does not believe the coalition in Khartoum is seriously interested in a peace formula which would permit the SPLA's political survival or that any compromise to which the South assents would be honored by the present government. The SPLA is thus working for a change, hoping chances for negotiation would be better under a successor government. The Government, for its part, sees the SPLA as less interested in peace than in pressing its military options on the ground, with Ethiopian support.

There is indeed an Ethiopian linkage to the war; while Ethiopia is not the key to peace in Southern Sudan, it is certainly a factor. Strong SPLA dependence on Ethiopia for arms and sanctuary, including recruiting in Sudanese refugee camps, gives Ethiopia considerable influence with the SPLA. During the past year, the Sudanese and Ethiopians have made intermittent efforts to act as mediators for each other with their respective insurgencies. These efforts are currently stalled.

In this checkered history of peace initiatives the United States stand has been clear.

We strongly believe a political solution needs to be found. Neither side will achieve a military victory. The warring parties themselves are in agreement on this, at least to the extent of their public statements.

We believe that the root causes of the war -- economic and political powersharing, national identity and Islamic law -- must be resolved by the Sudanese themselves. The conflict is internal and a solution imposed from outside cannot be expected to succeed. We recognize that the South has legitimate grievances which must be addressed and we have said so to both sides. Since the resolution is internal, we have not taken any positions on the merits of the issues which must be resolved. This includes the emotional issue of Islamic law; we consider the choice of a legal system to be a matter of national sovereignty.

But we have taken strong positions on some of the threshold aspects of a peace process and have continually pressed both sides hard. We support an early ceasefire and the postponement of action on the new shari'a law code until the issue can be decided at a constitutional conference. We have pressed both sides to be bolder, taking some risks and displaying greater statesmanship in the quest for peace. We have offered our operational help in the peace process in any any appropriate role acceptable to both sides.

We have also had discussions with the Soviets on the Horn of Africa and reviewed various roles that they and their friends in Addis Ababa could play in support of a Sudanese peace settlement. Ethiopia should desist from the role of spoiler in the use of its influence with the SPLA.

Finally, we need to consider the tools we have available to pursue our objectives. Any effective leverage we have in promoting our objectives applies only to Khartoum. We meet with the SPLA but have little or no leverage with them. We have virtually no influence over Ethiopia but have suggested the Soviets use theirs. The Soviets have said they would do so but the results are not yet apparent.

Our influence on the Sudanese Government relies more on our traditional friendship and Sudan's commitment to democracy than on leverage provided by U.S. aid. During three coalitions we have had unrestricted access to the highest levels of the Sudanese Government. This has allowed frank and frequent discussions at the top. But our privileged access is beginning to show wear as a result of extensive public criticism of Sudan, our declining assistance levels and the repeated hard messages we have delivered to Khartoum.

At this point, the Sudanese may well regard our assistance levels as little more than a barometer of our friendship. Those levels have declined steadily from 1985 when we provided $269 million in program assistance to Sudan to the FY 88 level of $73 million and FY 89 level of $64 million. As a practical matter, this does not represent strong economic influence since much of the aid is blocked. Sudan is heavily burdened with debt, which is now about $12 billion or about 170 percent of GNP; it is currently in arrears on all debt payments. Our program assistance to Sudan is currently blocked by legislation because of $15 million in arrearages on PL 480 payments, which prevent a new Title I wheat agreement, and $10 million in overdue Foreign Military Sales (FMS) payments. We are not sanguine that Sudan has the means to clear these arrearages this fiscal year. Sudan must pay a total of $78 million to the U.S. this year to keep program assistance flowing.

In conclusion, the dynamics of the peace process and our limited influence on the parties involved do not afford great hope for a quick move towards the peace table; and we do not see much operationally that we or Sudan's other friends can do to effectively nurture the peace process. We have made our views and hopes clearly known. We have shared them with Sudan's other donors and key friends, with neighbors, and with the Soviets.

We were most attentive and guardedly optimistic in November when the DUP and SPLA agreed to a ceasefire blueprint; it showed the needed flexibility by both sides on all issues -- even Islamic law -- and we strongly supported that initiative. It was the most significant step forward since Koka Dam in 1986. We were greatly disappointed when the Government did not follow through vigorously. We hope that the current coalition, now without the DUP, will quickly follow up on its announced commitment to produce a new peace initiative. We have no indication of what its form might be, the issues addressed in the DUP/SPLA agreement are certainly those which should be discussed.

The success of both sides on relief in recent months is somewhat better than on peace. The U.S. has done much to help existing relief efforts take hold and establish additional operations. This includes our sustained efforts to promote the the ICRC program to provide relief to those in need on both sides of war zone. Our policy is to provide relief wherever it is needed. The Embassy and AID mission in Khartoum spend well over half their time on relief-related issues. Mr. Bollinger will now discuss relief.

Senator SIMON. Thank you very much, Mr. Brown.
Mr. Bollinger.

STATEMENT OF WALTER G. BOLLINGER, ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR AFRICA, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. BOLLINGER. Mr. Chairman and committee members, I am very pleased to meet with you today.

As you requested, Mr. Chairman, I will submit my written statement for the record. In my oral remarks, I will make just a few points.

Senator SIMON. Your written statement will be entered in the record.

Mr. BOLLINGER. Thank you.

As Representative Wolf has accurately described, the situation in southern Sudan is grim. Civil war in the south has created dreadful conditions for the civilian population. Most of the south is cut off from the outside world, and, as a consequence, we lack precise information about the extent of the suffering.

Nevertheless, it is clear that suffering is extensive.

The government in Khartoum controls at least seven major besieged towns in southern Sudan. These towns shelter about 340,000 displaced people in need. Towns controlled by the Sudanese People's Liberation Army, the SPLA, may hold another 100,000.

About 6,000 tons per month of food are needed to feed these people.

In the rural areas of southern Sudan, over a million and a half people are estimated to be at risk. Getting anything to the south is difficult under the best of circumstances. Long distances and few or no roads frustrate any relief efforts.

The conflict makes it even more problematic.

Despite these obstacles, the United States is in the forefront of efforts to provide relief. We have supported the efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross—ICRC—to get relief to civilians on both sides of the line within the war zone. The ICRC operation was interrupted by the SPLA last week, but we were informed this morning that it has resumed.

The ICRC plan, as negotiated with the Government of Sudan and the SPLA, is limited to providing relief supplies to three government-controlled towns and three SPLA towns.

We hope the ICRC program can be expanded to cover additional towns on both sides in the near future.

The United States has provided 75 million dollars' worth of food and other assistance for emergency efforts for the south since February 1988. This support has included funds for over 150,000 metric tons of food, air charters, truck transport, medical supplies, spare parts for barges and trains, communications equipment, shelter materials, and refugee assistance.

At this point, we are working to get supplies to those in need as quickly as possible. We are also trying to preposition food where we can before the rains begin in late April or early May.

In this way, we hope to avert the horrific scenes of last summer in southern towns, such as Abyei and Aweil. We are encouraging other donors to increase their involvement. We continue to press all parties to the conflict to help relief efforts.

Against great odds, there are some examples of success. A supply train has reached Aweil with the first large shipment of food since early 1988. This complements the food which Julia Taft's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance has been flying into Aweil. Trucks have made it to Abyei, a government town in the southern quarter, where more than 30,000 displaced people have gathered.

A flotilla of Nile river barges with food has finally landed at Malakal, a southern town with a displaced population of about 45,000.

But much, much more remains to be done.

In this regard, we welcome the willingness of the Government of Sudan to host a United Nations emergency logistics meeting in Khartoum in early March. We hope that this meeting will offer the donors and the government a chance to agree on an action plan for getting enough food to the south before the rains begin.

We also hope that the meeting will be the means for providing services to displaced persons throughout Sudan.

As a consequence of the war in the south and poor government policies, the Sudanese economy is in dire straits. The external debt is staggering, and growing. Inflation is rampant. For several years, the government has been unable to reach agreement with the International Monetary Fund and the donor community on a comprehensive economic reform package.

Consequently, regular donor assistance to Sudan, that is, nonemergency assistance, is declining. Our AID nonemergency assistance levels have dropped considerably.

In 1985, U.S. economic assistance levels were just over $120 million. Planned commitments for fiscal year 1990 are under $45 million.

With little prospect of economic reform, the focus of the AID program has been redirected to emergency relief in support of priority humanitarian and development interests, such as child survival, population control, and natural resource management.

In summing up, I would like to reiterate that there continue to be substantial obstacles to providing emergency help on a timely basis. As I noted earlier, without peace, there can be no real prospect of meeting relief needs.

Secretary Baker's statement is a clear exposition of our posture in this regard. He said, "As friends of Sudan, we urge the Sudanese Government and the SPLA to put peace first and to agree to an early cease-fire, which would promote that goal and allow relief to reach those in need."

The United States, in concert with the rest of the international donor community, continues to press hard on both warring sides to provide better access to the innocent, noncombatant civilian populations, caught in the crossfire of the war.

To date, however, neither the SPLA nor the government has been willing, or perhaps able, to provide the level of support required for successful relief efforts.

Mr. Chairman, I would be pleased to answer questions at the appropriate time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bollinger follows:]

PREPARED STATMENT OF WALTER G. BOLLINGER

Mr. Chairman and committee members, I am pleased to appear before the Committee today to update you on the situation in southern Sudan, and the United States Government's role in the international relief programs currently under way in that region.

The situation today in southern Sudan is grim. Years of intense fighting have devastated the region. Today over two million survivors are at risk. Many continue to die because of the tragic civil war which afflicts Sudan.

Unfortunately, there continue to be substantial obstacles to providing help on a timely basis. The United States, in concert with the rest of the international donor community, continues to try to provide relief assistance to the region and continues to press hard on both warring sides to provide better access to the innocent, non-combatant civilian populations caught in the cross-fire of the war.

Since February 1988, the United States has committed over $60 million in relief assistance to meet the urgent and humanitarian requirements of the south and for war-displaced southerners. The problem is not a lack of food or other resources. The problem is the fighting which prevents us from getting the food to the people.

There can be no doubt that the survival of these innocent millions trapped in southern Sudan will continue to be in grave danger until the fighting stops. It is just as clear there can be no long term progress of any sort in the region until peace reigns. It is essential, therefore, that a cessation of hostilities be achieved so that adequate relief can be provided to the many people at risk.

*   *

The emergency humanitarian relief objectives of this Administration, and its predecessors, have been consistent:

-- to identify people at risk of famine and other life-threatening situations, wherever these people may be;

-- to understand what assistance the host country or indigenous relief organizations will provide, and then, in concert with the other donors, respond in an appropriate fashion;

-- to monitor and evaluate as much as possible the distribution of our assistance during and after implementation of the programs; and

-- to deal successfully with the bottlenecks that arise so often during implementation of all relief programs.

On February 7th, the Secretary of State said:

> "We call on authorities at all levels on both sides to remove remaining obstacles and do everything possible to provide emergency relief to victims caught in garrison towns and other areas of the war zone. Failure to do so will mean that thousands more will die in the coming rainy season. The United States will do all it can to

> support this effort. We call on other donors also to undertake or expand relief efforts."

The Secretary concluded his statement by saying:

> "As friends of Sudan we urge the Sudanese Government and the SPLA to put peace first and to agree to an early ceasefire which would promote that goal and allow relief to reach those in need."

The U.S. has been carrying out emergency food relief programs in Sudan for the past five years, with our efforts more and more targetted towards southern Sudanese. Since 1986, the war in southern Sudan has increasingly disrupted life in the South. It has forced over a million people to flee for their lives. Over three hundred thousand trekked to asylum in Ethiopian refugee camps. More than a million others made their way towards Khartoum in search of shelter, food and a safe haven. Over two million remain entrapped in the south. Many of these individuals are completely dependent on relief for survival.

The greatest constraints to providing relief to the people in the south have always been logistics and the threats posed to relief efforts by the combatants. Both sides in the war (the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army - SPLA) need to cooperate to facilitate emergency relief.

In 1984, when the U.S. first began to provide large amounts of emergency relief to Sudanese and refugees, the great size of the country, long distances and rudimentary infrastructure were major constraints in delivering relief. Substantial efforts were undertaken by all donors to improve Sudan's railway and truck fleets and to improve storage and distribution. Even in areas where the Government has full access, there were substantial delays and, ultimately, use of airlift was required to ensure food was available to people at risk on a timely basis. In 1985, for example, A.I.D. carried out an extremely effective but quite expensive emergency relief program via helicopter in western Sudan. A.I.D. also used land trains across the desert, camel caravans, barge convoys and unit trains to improve delivery of emergency relief within the country. These efforts were successful and widespread famine problems were generally avoided.

As the food shortages and famine threat in the north and east receded, however, the war in the south escalated and the human problems associated with the war began to increase and become more noticeable. In coordination with the Government and the donor community, A.I.D. planned similarly comprehensive relief efforts to the south. Unfortunately, during the last several years these efforts have faced insurmountable obstacles. Not enough could be done. Nonetheless, efforts continued, as possible, and progress has been made, especially during this dry season.

Donors gained Government permission to undertake relief programs in the south and the Government's policy was generally favorable towards relief programs. Field implementation was not always up to expectations or as forthcoming as official Government policy. It was often difficult to move emergency assistance into rural areas. The Sudanese transportation and governmental infrastructure is weak, especially in the South. Commands from Khartoum were often not implemented or only partially implemented after extraordinary efforts by the donors. Consistent donor dialogue with the Government highlighted implementation issues but the dialogue was time consuming and directed at the center. Persistent economic and political turmoil further frustrated the institutional capacity of Government counterparts.

Moreover, both Government and SPLA forces have been suspicious of efforts in rural areas. Both sides believed that independent organizations might use relief assets to support the military objectives of their adversaries. A war was under way and relief convoys and planes were shot at or downed regularly. Operation Rainbow, an ill-fated United Nations sponsored airlift to the south, was terminated in 1986 after one of its planes was shot down by the SPLA. As a consequence of these and other incidents, relief programs concentrated in Government-held towns such as Juba and Wau, with minimal penetration into rural areas. And programs to those towns became more and more constricted.

In early 1986, in addition to our direct, bilateral U.S. emergency relief assistance, A.I.D. was also supporting other donors' programs in the south through organizations such as Band Aid, the World Food Program and World Vision.

In the Spring of 1986, as the situation in the south became more aggravated and relief efforts more problematic, the U.S. Government became increasingly concerned about reports of suffering. A variety of responses were attempted to enlarge the diameter of the pipeline to the south. Representatives of A.I.D. talked with representatives of all sides fighting in the south to determine what type of additional assistance could be delivered into the region. As a result of the talks, A.I.D.

tried - unsuccessfully - to find a cooperating sponsor willing to work in areas that had not previously been reached in southern Sudan.

At the same time, A.I.D. adopted a strategy of trying continually to provide food relief into the south by positioning relief "around" the south (in northern Sudan, Kenya, Uganda and through Zaire), and delivering it when and if it was possible.

In order to carry out these programs, the United States concluded a series of grain swaps in 1987 for 32,000 MT of food - with the Governments of Kenya and Sudan. Other donors made efforts to purchase local food in Uganda. These stocks supplemented earlier large stocks which the A.I.D. mission had stored from the drought emergency relief efforts of 1985.

During 1986 and early 1987, groups like Church World Service and Lutheran World Relief delivered several thousand tons of emergency relief supplies funded by the U.S. from Kenya and Uganda, and through Zaire, into southwestern Sudan. Other groups such as the World Food Program airlifted food into southern Sudan from Khartoum and Kosti, in the north. Overall, the objective had been to preposition about 70,000 MT in the south. Finally, these efforts collectively moved less than half that amount in the 1987 dry season. Some commercial grain was also going into the south.

Barge convoys ran the gauntlet up the Nile, from Kosti to Renk and Malakal. Relief trains made their way - very slowly - to Aweil. And truck convoys went from Kenya to Uganda and then tried to make it through the war into the towns of Juba and

Torit. Food was also airlifted into the south from Kenya and Uganda. While these programs were somewhat successful, they reached only a limited number of the people trapped in the war and, as previously, generally only people in areas controlled by the Government. By the end of 1987 it was clear that the situation of the population had reached an awful state. Fewer supplies were getting in through relief or commercial channels. Local production was minimized because of the fighting. Reports of civilian deaths began to mount. With the donors, A.I.D. worked to keep relief supplies moving to the extent possible. Obstacles to such efforts grew.

Emblematic of such obstacles is the fate of those who have risked their lives to move supplies to the south. Sadly, the lives of many relief workers have been lost in these efforts. Convoys were attacked on a regular basis, and trucks savaged and drivers killed. In several incidents in Uganda truck drivers were murdered. In other incidents trucks have been destroyed by mines or hijacked. Pilferage by roaming bands of guerrillas and bandits are common in southern Sudan. In early 1988 a barge convoy to Malakal was attacked several times. A few barges were sunk and about a dozen guards were killed. Trains have faced similar troubles. Track has been removed and bridges have been demolished. Roads too have been destroyed. As the insecurity spread, relief operations in several towns were halted. MSF/France (Doctors Without Borders) had to halt operations in Aweil in 1986. The International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) suspended its operations in 1986. Other international organizations like the World Vision Relief Organization (WVRO) were forced to leave unsettled areas like Wau by the Government.

Food was diverted, stolen and otherwise never reached the people for whom it was intended. In 1987, for example, about four thousand tons of food destined for Wau was "lost" in Raga under unclear circumstances. Other allegations have been made, but the security situation in the south makes effective monitoring of relief supplies impossible.

Ultimately, because of the inability to provide relief to people where they needed it, millions began to flee the south. They too faced unimaginable horrors in their March out. No one knows how many died en route from of the fighting. This exodus created new problems, since few Sudanese villages and towns were prepared for an influx of nomadic pastoralists from the south. Displaced peoples congregated wherever they thought relief would be forthcoming and created severe stress on the functioning of the rural economies in southern Darfur and Kordofan. Several hundred thousand young men and boys made a longer, more arduous trek to western Ethiopia, where they became refugees - creating additional emergency problems in that country.

While non-governmental organizations began relief programs for the displaced peoples in the rural areas, the plight of the displaced peoples who eventually survived and straggled into Khartoum was yet another major and unpleasant problem for a Government struggling with a multitude of other major and pressing problems. Only a minimal amount of assistance was provided by donor agencies who, quite naturally, concentrated their efforts on trying to reach those worse off and still in the south.

In 1987 and 1988, because of mounting concern over the situation and the inability to get supplies to the south, the U.S. (principally) began urging the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to re-mount a program, delivering relief supplies to both sides of the war zone. It was hoped that this effort might ensure an even-handed approach to the increasingly difficult problem of supplying relief to peoples in a war zone. This program had a very long gestation period because of the suspicions both sides harbored about each other and the ICRC. The program finally got under way in December 1988 and has delivered some relief but by no means what it could if it were supported by both sides in the way it should be. The program was suspended during the week of February 13th. Flights resumed on February 22.. However, we understand that agreement has now been reached for resumption of activities.

As noted above, by the end of 1987, the U.S., which had been monitoring the situation continually and searching for ways to increase the flow of relief supplies into the region, continued to talk frankly with the Government about the problems and its responsibilities in the region. The U.S. continued to seek more and better quality Government of Sudan support for relief efforts in the south, as well as improved support for programs to aid the displaced peoples in the north.

The Government of Sudan, as a result, focused more effort on the problems of the displaced populations and those still left in the south. But more needed to be done. A number of tracks were followed.

In June 1988, the Prime Minister asked the United Nations to alert the donor community to the grave situation of the displaced peoples in Sudan. The United Nations sent in a high level team in early summer 1988. The team's visit was followed by devastating floods in Khartoum and other northern cities, which had severe impact on the displaced peoples. After reviewing the effects of the devastating floods of August 1988, and further discussions with the Government to ensure there was an agreed upon Government policy on displaced peoples, the United Nations issued a $70 million appeal for emergency assistance for the displaced people in the north and those still at risk in the south.

By late summer 1988, it was clear that these and other efforts were not having a quick enough effect. The 1988 dry season effort had failed to preposition sufficient amounts of food in the south. The refugee flows to Ethiopia in late 1987 and the surge of displaced persons during the summer underlined the need to act quickly. Again information about the situation was sparse.

More evidence of the full horror of the suffering became apparent late in the summer as reports of the situation at Abyei came to light. Abyei is a small town located on the edge of the south in Southern Khordofan. During the summer of 1988 thousands of displaced people arrived in Abyei. They were in pitiful condition; sick, tired and hungry.

Abyei itself is inaccessible during the rainy season. There was little food in the town and there were no facilities for shelter. A few PVOs were present and they made heroic efforts to help. Daily death rates were very high. Supplies were inadequate. Resupply was slow and communication to Khartoum was infrequent. When word of the situation reached Khartoum the donors were galvanized to act unilaterally.

The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance quickly mounted a large-scale relief operation. Through the efforts of OFDA an emergency airlift was put in motion which was able to has continued into the dry season and has been complemented by overland transport of food. Efforts are under way to ensure that sufficient food is in place for the next dry season.

The attention on Abyei represented a tremendous step forward. In response to world concern over Abyei, the Government took a more forthcoming position on assistance. Likewise, many suspect that heightened public attention on the suffering in Sudan swayed the SPLA to finally allow the ICRC operation to start. Other donors joined the United States in undertaking enhanced efforts to move more food to the south. Other promising things began to happen including serious talk of peace in December. For a time there was momentum for relief.

Since Abyei, other extraordinary efforts have been mounted. Unfortunately, while progress has been made, the size of the need far exceeds the donor's ability to deliver and the political climate has deteriorated. Security, transport infrastructure and nature constrain operations. A gruesome example of this reality is the situation at the besieged town of Aweil. Relief workers finally got into Aweil last fall. No food had been delivered to Aweil since early in 1988. The workers discovered that 8,000 had died of starvation at Aweil during the summer. Immediate efforts were made to initiate an airlift to Aweil to provide food. Food is now moving and the suffering has been abated. But, it is estimated that the donors need to get over 5,000 MT of food into Aweil before the next rains to feed those still alive. The small airstrip at

Aweil and lack of regular overland access make this a hard target to achieve.

Aweil is but one town. There are several others in the south in the same situation. Without peace or a more forthcoming attitude from all concerned, it will be impossible to meet these urgent humanitarian needs.

Since the fall, the U.S. has provided almost $5 million of non-food emergency relief. Some of this money - $1.5 million - was granted to the Government's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) - for airlift, truck and train deliveries to Aweil, airlift to other locations and for vehicles for the RRC.

The U.S. has also provided over $3 million of assistance for a variety of other activities carried out by numerous organizations. These activities have included marine radios and tugboats to improve barge delivery of supplies to Malakal, money to UNICEF for drugs, medical supplies and water supply, money to Catholic Relief Services for airlifting of food to Juba, airlifting parachutes for an airdrop of supplies into Torit, and further airlifts in southern Sudan.

A.I.D. also supports other attempts to augment relief into southern Sudan from neighboring countries. As stated previously, we had tried to develop such activities in 1986, to no avail. Now the U.S. has intensified its efforts to develop a viable way to provide relief throughout the South.

While one of the major problems with providing assistance into rural areas of southern Sudan in the past has been total lack of information about conditions, now some (hopefully) reliable information is being generated. Coupled with the prior track records of the organizations requesting assistance, and with a better logistical network, there is a better chance to deliver assistance into formerly unreachable areas of southern Sudan.

The basic thrust of U.S. Government emergency relief policy and strategy towards southern Sudan now is two-fold:

-- wherever possible for the U.S. and other donors to continue to provide as much emergency relief as possible and practical, given the constraints, and

-- wherever possible to pre-position and stockpile as much as practical before the rainy season comes in earnest in several months time.

In summation, the human suffering in southern Sudan is extensive and pervasive. If we, the other donors and the warring parties cannot provide humanitarian, emergency relief assistance now, conditions will only get worse in the future and more people will die needlessly.

A.I.D. is prepared to provide whatever assistance is possible and appropriate, within available resources, to the region to reduce human suffering. Unfortunately, as Secretary Baker said,

> "The sad reality, however, is that starvation will almost certainly not end until the fighting ends."

Our efforts will, at best, be only partially effective until the Government of Sudan and the SPLA stop their fighting and peace returns to the region. When that happens, or when there is an effective ceasefire in the south, then, and only then, will the donors and other relief organizations be able to identify and deliver adequate and appropriate amounts of emergency assistance to the many suffering people of southern Sudan.

It is possible the upcoming meeting called by the United Nations, in Khartoum in early March, will help achieve this objective. A.I.D., of course, will participate in the meeting.

All people of compassion and peace are optimistic the fighting will soon cease. It is only then that the many innocent victims of this war, the ones we and so many others grieve over and try so hard to help, will be truly accessible, safe and at peace.

[redacted] [redacted] - SUDAN


NORTHERN REGION
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Juba
Yei
Torit
Sites
Population Movements

Senator SIMON. Thank you very much.

I am very pleased to have as a final member of this panel Ms. Julia Taft.

STATEMENT OF JULIA V. TAFT, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF U.S. FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Ms. TAFT. Thank you very much.

I do not have a formal statement to make, but I am here to answer any questions about the specific relief activities that are funded by AID and the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance.

There may be some merit in commenting on Congressman Wolf's discussion and yours, too, about the comparison between the disaster response in Armenia and the one in the Sudan.

Just briefly, I think everyone is actually quite accurate in summing up the kind of press attention, the kind of emotional and tangible outpouring of assistance that went forward to Armenia.

The United States contributed $2 million of relief assistance to Armenia. We were only one of 90 countries that made contributions to that.

We see ourselves quite differently in the Sudan. We have provided $75.5 million in emergency relief for the Sudan since February 1988. The United States is, by far, the dominant donor. There are only about eight or nine other countries which have made significant contributions to the Sudan for this humanitarian program.

I think this is something we need to keep in mind, because the Sudan emergency is an issue of international humanitarian concern. The United States, I believe, has taken a strong lead in the response over the last year, and even longer than that. We would appreciate ideas that you all might have for the administration on how we can expand the participation of other donors, particularly the Europeans, to this international relief program, so that it's not just up to the few donors that are active now.

I and my colleagues stand ready to answer your questions. Thank you very much.

Senator SIMON. Thank you.

We will follow the 10-minute rule, I say to whoever is running the timer, for Senator Kassebaum, Senator Humphrey, and myself.

I don't know if you saw the New York Times article. There was an Associated Press story, which probably appeared elsewhere, too, in which the Sudanese Army apparently has given the Premier there in Sudan an ultimatum to move more decisively, either toward peace or toward war.

Mr. Brown, maybe you are the person to comment, if you have seen the article. Do you have any comment on the current situation? Does it look like change is in the offing there?

Mr. BROWN. Well, sir, we are not exactly certain what is happening.

We do know that the high-level military leadership of the Sudan military establishment did meet on the 20th. They have presented to the government and to Prime Minister Sadiq a memorandum which sets forth their interests in seeing a change in policy, apparently more toward more vigorous activity in trying to settle the war.

We do not have the details of this proposal. It is indicated, however, that they are also talking about a change in government in the sense that they would like to see a broader based government. They apparently have given the government 7 days in which to reply to this memorandum, without specifying what they would do at the end of the 7 days.

This apparently has brought about intense consultations between the government and the leaders of the military. There is even a press report today that Prime Minister Sadiq has already agreed to revise the government, to make it broader based. But we do not have confirmation of that.

Senator SIMON. In November, there was a tentative agreement for peace, in terms of the parties involved. But the Prime Minister did not refer that to parliament or to his cabinet.

Do you know the reason for not referring it?

Mr. BROWN. The Prime Minister and his government had reservations about some of the provisions of that agreement. They were particularly hesitant in regard to a provision which required suspension or revocation of agreements with other countries, which the agreement indicated might infringe on the sovereignty of Sudan.

They were also hesitant over the question of lifting the state of emergency before there was a cease-fire.

They did not come out in support of that agreement. The government did not come out in support of that agreement. But neither did it reject it.

The problem has been that they did not pursue it vigorously. They have not taken that opportunity, which we saw as quite a good one, to pursue a peace agreement, to use that tentative agreement as a basis for a peace agreement.

They have not rejected it. They keep saying that they'll come up with some sort of amplification, but that hasn't been done.

Senator SIMON. In terms of pursuing vigorously, critics of our own policy—and I have to say, in fairness, primarily from the previous administration, because the new administration has just been in power for a few weeks now—but there are those who say that we have not been pursuing vigorously enough and pushing enough to try to bring about reconciliation.

How would you respond to that?

Mr. BROWN. That's a mistaken impression, Senator.

This administration is continuing policies which were pursued by the Reagan administration, in terms of trying both to promote peace and to increase relief to the people in need.

We have been in touch with both sides in the war over a long period of many months, meeting with both the SPLA and the Government of Sudan, to press them to come to the negotiating table to settle the dispute.

At the same time, we have worked with both sides to bring about their cooperation in the relief effort. It was through U.S. efforts, for example, that the ICRC program got underway.

As I believe you are aware, this is a program under which food is provided to both sides of the war zone. It needs to be expanded. It is not nearly large enough.

But it was largely in the beginning at U.S. initiative that that got underway. We started talking to the Sudanese Government and to the SPLA about that in November 1987.

So, this is not a new thing.

We have continued our contacts. We have met repeatedly with the Government of Sudan, with Prime Minister Sadiq, with the leadership of the SPLA, including John Garang himself, to try to bring about both peace and relief.

The Bush administration has continued this, has added vigor to it in terms of the statement made by Secretary Baker. But this was not the first statement made by the Government on these issues. It was the third, as a matter of fact. We had made one in October and made one again in November.

What we have been pleased about is that President Bush and Secretary Baker are indeed continuing this interest in the United States taking as active a role as possible in favor of both relief and peace.

Senator SIMON. Let me just add something that I mentioned to Congressman Wolf, and that is the more rapidly we can speed getting an Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, I think it would be in everyone's best interests, not only Sudan's. But there are some things pending in the southern part of Africa that I think could be significant.

Mr. BROWN. We couldn't agree with you more, sir.

Senator SIMON. May I ask Mr. Bollinger and Ms. Taft, either one of you, at what level does the United States intend to participate in the UNICEF meeting at Khartoum? There is concern, frankly, that it not just be a low-level meeting in talking about the problems there.

Mr. BOLLINGER. We are at this time sorting through what level of participation we should have.

I think it will depend to a large extent on the level of participation from other donors and the actual agenda which is put together for consideration by the U.N. sponsors.

Our inclination at this time is to have a high-level representation, a level of representation which would include Ms. Taft or perhaps myself.

Senator SIMON. May I ask both of you this question.

If, all of a sudden, George Bush called you into the Oval Office and said what should we be doing in the Sudan, what would you answer?

Let's call on you first, Mr. Bollinger.

Mr. BOLLINGER. This is a question, Senator Simon, which we struggle with and ask ourselves almost on a daily basis, though not quite in that form—how one deals with this problem in Sudan.

I think that Ken Brown has really put the issue front and center. It's an issue of war and peace. Until a means is found to bring about a cessation of hostilities, until we have either a cease-fire or some kind of permanent peace agreement in Sudan, it's going to be very, very difficult to mount a meaningful relief effort.

The distances are too great. The conflict results in an inability of relief organizations to work in the affected areas. The hostilities are at the base of the problem.

I think that that is the source of frustration which we all share in struggling on a day-to-day basis with relief problems in Sudan.

Senator **Simon**. Ms. Taft.

Ms. **Taft**. It is true that the answer is peace. But we cannot influence that, I do not believe, to any great degree.

In preparation for the U.N. meeting, however, we have tried to develop an agenda of actions that we believe are within the capacity of the Government of the Sudan to agree to, within the capacity of the U.N. family to agree to, and within the capacity of the SPLA to agree to. There are some very concrete steps that we feel can be taken between now and the rainy season unilaterally, on the part of the Government of the Sudan. We are working on outlining those steps and preparing to present them to the Government of the Sudan. We hope to achieve substantive progress at the meetings on a few of these items.

The same is true with the U.N. We have been discussing with the U.N. a program where they might flag various convoys that would be self-contained, with only relief goods, and be monitored and accompanied by expatriate personnel. We propose high visibility and publicity for these U.N. or ICRC flag convoys, so that it is quite clear to all sides that they should go unfettered.

I feel that we have to take each objective and the plan of action individually. The way one deals with each of these affected cities and areas is different. Sometimes relief must be transported by trains, sometimes by barges, and sometimes by donkeys. We have to look at the relief program as a whole—all geographic areas and all types of conveyances. I think we can make progress by developing a plan of action for which it is reasonable to press the Government of the Sudan to agree to—pieces of which are manageable, with the assistance of the U.N. and other donors.

But the real answer is peace.

Senator **Simon**. Thank you.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Thank you.

Ms. Taft, I would like to follow up on that for just a moment. When you said flagging the convoys, hasn't that really been the problem all along? And this goes back even to 1986, when there were difficulties getting food through and there were periodic problems with famine in areas of the south.

I would suggest even that this is a reason perhaps other donors, no matter how much aid you have, one of the problems has been getting it through; isn't that correct?

Ms. **Taft**. That's right.

Senator **Kassebaum**. So, why has there been so much difficulty being able to provide a military escort or flagging the convoys?

Ms. **Taft**. One of the problems with the military escorts is just the availability of the escorts. As we are all quite aware, feeding the south is not the top priority of either side. There is a conflict going on.

So, getting the military escorts for convoys has been difficult. The commingling of military and commercial items with relief items has been a big problem. For instance, the barges for Malakal, for which we provided spare parts back in September just arrived, because they were adding commercial and military barges that had to go down with the convoy. It took months to get there.

We are urging the separation of commercial and military items from relief goods so relief commodities can be flagged by the U.N. and accompanied by expats. We can move trains and barges more quickly and safely that way.

Now, this is not a brandnew idea. We just haven't gotten an agreement on the part of everyone to do this. The U.N. now is very willing to go forward with it. We have presented this as an option to both sides and we hope to make some progress on it.

Senator KASSEBAUM. You mentioned, Mr. Bollinger, that the Red Cross is back in now.

Mr. BOLLINGER. Yes, that's correct.

The Red Cross program, after over a year of negotiation, was mounted in December 1988. It was interrupted briefly last week, as I said in my earlier remarks, by the SPLA, but was resumed with a flight yesterday.

Senator KASSEBAUM. It has to be very frustrating for everybody watching this situation to see how difficult it is to even get the International Red Cross or the United Nations in.

This was something that in Ethiopia at the height of the famine there, it was never quite uniquely the problem that it has been in Sudan.

I came in late, but I think you touched on the press, Senator Simon, did you not——

Senator SIMON. Yes, that's right.

Senator KASSEBAUM [continuing]. On their focusing on this?

Perhaps this may be one reason there just has not been a clear understanding of the tragedy taking place, because it has not been covered.

Mr. BOLLINGER. I would like to make one additional comment on the U.N. flagging idea. For that to be successful, of course, it takes a recognition of the U.N. flag by both combatants in this dispute. As we have seen with the ICRC negotiations, which were protracted indeed, to negotiate an agreement on the part of both parties to respect the U.N. flag is not something that is going to be brought off overnight or over a weekend. It will take months of negotiation, if past is prolog, before that could be realized.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Somebody, I don't remember just who, perhaps it was Representative Wolf, touched on the refugees in Ethiopia. There are several camps, are there not, within Ethiopia? Are there any within Sudan?

Ms. TAFT. No.

Senator KASSEBAUM. There is no real settlement, as such, within Sudan?

Ms. TAFT. These are Sudanese refugees that have gone into Ethiopia.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I suppose you wouldn't call them refugees within Sudan.

Ms. TAFT. Well, they are displaced persons within Sudan. The Sudanese that have gone into Ethiopia started moving at about this time last year.

There are over 300,000 or 400,000—is that right?

Mr. BOLLINGER. That's correct.

Ms. TAFT. About 400,000 are there.

However, the displaced people that have gone north are frequently relatives of people that went east into Ethiopia. Of those that went north, there are about a million who have come up to Khartoum. Many others have been in areas that are not in conflict zones now, but they had escaped from the conflict zones. Those are in Muglad, Abyei, Babanusa, El Miram. Those are places where we have relief programs. They are in small camps. They are not in large displaced persons camps.

Senator KASSEBAUM. In Khartoum itself, is the International Red Cross there?

Ms. TAFT. There is not as much assistance in the displaced persons areas of Khartoum as there needs to be. I think this will be one of the key issues, as Mr. Bollinger pointed out, at the U.N. conference and we want to raise that. These people cannot be overlooked when one is looking at needy people within the Sudan.

There are a couple of nongovernmental organizations that are involved in Khartoum, and the World Bank, of course, is mounting a program that will address relief for flood victims, which will also include special programs for displaced persons in Khartoum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I'm guessing from what you say, just pointing out the negotiations with the International Red Cross, for instance, that all of the aid programs, whether it's U.N. or United States, whatever it might be, have to be approved by not only the Sudan Government, but the SPLA.

Ms. TAFT. Yes, for the ICRC programs in southern Sudan.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Any of them. Is that right?

Mr. BOLLINGER. Well, in areas where the Government of the Sudan is in control, you are only dealing with that entity. The ICRC program is unique in that it provides assistance on both sides of the line and, therefore, arrangements had to be negotiated with both parties in order for the program to become operable.

Senator KASSEBAUM. All right. But with the Sudanese Government, you don't have to get approval from them for aid efforts?

Mr. BOLLINGER. Indeed, we do.

You see, in southern Sudan there are a number of garrisoned towns, which are in the control of the Government of Sudan.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I realize that.

Mr. BOLLINGER. Numbers of displaced people have moved into those towns. The programs that are carried out in those towns are done cooperatively with PVO's and with the agreement of the Government of Sudan.

Senator KASSEBAUM. And then, in an SPLA area, it's with the SPLA?

Mr. BOLLINGER. At this particular time, we don't have programs that are designed to impact in the SPLA areas, because of the difficulties of working out the arrangements.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Just as a matter of curiosity, do any of you have any thoughts on the idea that Representative Wolf expressed and others, too, of sort of a mediator or negotiator that would go between the different groups?

Mr. **Brown**. Senator, as I was noting earlier, we have been in contact with both sides for a good many months, and we continue to do that. We have made efforts to bring the two sides together. We brokered at one point a summit meeting between the Prime Minister and John Garang. That fell through, primarily on the SPLA side.

But it is an example of the kind of effort that we have made. We have made clear to both sides that we stand ready to continue to help. We have offered our good offices in that regard.

Certainly, the proposal by the Congressman is worth considering.

Senator **Kassebaum**. It is part of the resolution that has been or will be introduced by Senator Kennedy, Senator Simpson, Senator Simon, and myself.

I wasn't quite as strong a supporter of maybe an independent negotiator, but I am curious here.

Mr. **Brown**. I am not certain that the time is now ripe. It is certainly a suggestion that bears close examination.

We need to look at it in terms of the receptiveness of both sides, the status of the war. And, as you know, right now the war is going better for the SPLA than it is for the government. When one side sort of has the upperhand, how willing are they going to be to talk peace? I think that is always a valid question.

Another thing we need to bear in mind is the current events in Khartoum itself. The government itself is under a lot of pressure right now to do things that it has not been doing. We would not want to give anybody the impression that somehow we are going to come in and solve problems in a way that we couldn't do. We don't want to give anybody an excuse that might be a disservice in the situation, rather than a service.

But certainly we would examine that possibility, and at the time that it seemed most worth trying, we would be willing to do so.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Thank you.

Senator **Simon**. Thank you.

Senator Humphrey.

Senator **Humphrey**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Certainly the people of Sudan are entitled to the internal disagreements. But when it comes to gross human rights violations, then it becomes a matter of concern to the international community.

I want to ask you, Secretary Brown, has the Department concluded that food or the withholding of food has been used as a weapon by both sides? Is that the conclusion of the Department?

Mr. **Brown**. Senator, as I noted in my opening statement, neither side has placed the question of feeding the needy as their first priority. They have placed the political questions and the military questions as a first priority.

There has been inefficiency, there has been negligence, and there have been just plain problems of logistics, transportation, communications.

Senator **Humphrey**. You used the word "negligence."

Mr. **Brown**. Yes.

Senator **Humphrey**. Is that all there is, or has there been deliberate, cynical use of starvation?

Mr. **Brown**. We have not concluded that either side has adopted a policy of using food as a weapon, deliberately as a weapon, against the population.

Senator **Humphrey**. One of the members of the succeeding panel is Mr. John Prendergast of the Coalition for Peace in the Horn of Africa. He is quite critical of the United States and the role of multilateral organizations. I will read from his testimony and will query him about it at the appropriate time. He says, "The U.S. Government's hesitation on taking the bold steps necessary to create the conditions of peace"—I'm sorry—criticizing the U.S. Government for its "hesitation in taking the bold steps necessary to create the conditions for peace."

Apart from the logistics, focusing on the political element, if you will, which seems important, have we been hesitant in taking the steps necessary for the creation of peace, in your opinion?

Mr. **Brown**. We certainly have not been hesitant in trying to do what we can. We, of course, cannot create conditions for peace in Sudan. But we certainly have done what we can and continue to do what we can to promote those conditions for peace. We have been active at this for a long time.

Senator, of course, as you know, there is always the question of a balance between what one does in terms of private diplomacy and what one does in public. One is always looking for the ideal balance.

We have done both and we have increased the part of the equation which has involved the public side. But we have been active in this for a long time, a good many months.

Senator **Humphrey**. What leverage do we have with Sudan, both sides, both sides there?

Mr. **Brown**. Well, the problem is that in concrete terms, our leverage is very slight.

There is, I think, a mistaken idea that we have a huge aid portfolio that we can somehow hold over the Sudanese Government's head and say that we'll withhold this if you don't cooperate.

But when one looks at the situation practically one realizes that, as a result of the government being under Brooke amendment sanctions, as a result of its arrearages in regard to Public Law 480, the tangible assistance on the economic side that might be available for the Government in this year amounts to about $10 million.

On the side for military assistance, Sudan has been zeroed out for 2 years in a row.

So, we have very little leverage in that sense.

But I think what we do have is an ongoing relationship and a history of good relations with Sudan. We have contact with the government, with the military. We have had a history of goodwill and cooperation that we have been continually able to draw on.

Now, sooner or later, that ability may run out.

Senator **Humphrey**. But what good has it done us so far, following the quiet diplomacy route?

Mr. **Brown**. I think it's done a lot of good.

I think we have been able to enlist the cooperation of both sides, particularly in regard to the relief effort. Their cooperation, the cooperation on both sides has increased considerably.

I mentioned the ICRC program. This is a program in which two combatants have agreed that an international agency can feed people on the side of the enemy, and that is a significant accomplishment.

It took a long time to put it together, but it's something that we plugged away at for a long time.

Senator Simon asked earlier what we ought to do, if President Bush asked us what ought we do, what would we say?

I think a part of the answer would be to stay engaged, maintain the contact, maintain the pressure, maintain the persuasion, and draw on whatever it is that has allowed us to have this contact, this access, and this influence, particularly with the Sudanese Government.

We have maintained the contacts with the SPLA to the extent that they are willing to talk to us. We don't have leverage over them, but we have been able to enlist their cooperation in this ICRC program, and we continue to try to do this and to expand ways in which the two sides can be fed, through ICRC or through other means.

Senator HUMPHREY. Are you saying that the only leverage that we have, economic leverage, is $10 million in U.S. aid?

Mr. BROWN. I probably should defer to my colleagues from AID here, but I do know that because of Brooke and because of Public Law 480 arrearages, the overall global figure for 1989, allotted for 1989, is illusory; that in practical terms, we have very little of that that we can allocate for Sudan.

Senator HUMPHREY. What is the value of aid from multilateral organizations, approximately? Just a quick dollar figure, if you can.

Mr. BOLLINGER. I would say, just hazarding a guess, that it would be in the area of several hundred million dollars.

Senator HUMPHREY. Now that's substantial leverage.

Have we considered at all trying to organize sanctions by multilateral organizations, or at least threaten them through multilateral organizations, as a way to bring about a cease-fire?

Mr. BOLLINGER. I would like to add that, in addition to the financial flows from the multilateral organizations, the Government of Sudan receives substantial financial assistance from a number of Arab countries.

So, while Sudan's overall financial situation is precarious—its international debts are in the area of $12 billion, and it's $1 billion in arrears to the International Monetary Fund—IMF—it has enough on a cash-flow basis to keep going without significant threat at this particular point in time.

Senator HUMPHREY. Has there been any consideration, has it been discussed in the policy levels, any discussion of trying to organize sanctions by multilateral organizations? That is my question.

Mr. BOLLINGER. There have been none of which I am aware.

Senator HUMPHREY. No discussions of that, even of an option?

Mr. BOLLINGER. That's correct.

I think the judgment is that it would be very difficult, as we have seen in other sanctions cases, to make that kind of sanction arrangement come into being.

Senator HUMPHREY. I will concede that you know more about the Sudan than I do, but, given the precarious economic or fiscal situation, versus, let's say, South Africa, I suspect there is a lot more leverage there than you perhaps recognize.

In any event, Mr. Prendergast contends that more aid will not purchase more leverage at this point. He says that a cease-fire could be achieved tomorrow in the war if international donors, led by the United States, froze all aid, except emergency food and medicine, and conditioned its resumption on the achievement of peace within the country.

Mr. Brown, what is your thought on that contention?

Mr. BROWN. I'm not sure what effect that would have on the SPLA, in terms of the impact of the sanctions.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, it would seem to have the effect on the government of negotiating at least with the SPLA, perhaps reconsidering, or considering for the first time, seriously, the agreement reached between one of the Khartoum parties and the SPLA, would it not? Is that not likely?

Mr. BROWN. What we have been trying to do, certainly, is to get the government to take more seriously this DUP-SPLA package, which we hope would bring the parties to the table. What they do at the table, of course, there we are not absolutely sure what will happen.

Senator HUMPHREY. That effort has borne no fruit, then?

Mr. BROWN. That's right.

Senator HUMPHREY. What have we done, then, to try to get them to consider this agreement?

Mr. BROWN. Well, what we have done is pressed, encouraged, and cajoled, to try to get them to accept that agreement as a basis for negotiation. We have not been successful.

I noted earlier that the government has indicated that it might come out with a variation.

We now have this development in Khartoum as well, in which the military seems to be saying to the government that they want it to be more serious about the negotiation. That may have an impact.

Senator HUMPHREY. A call for discussions today may be moot next week. But, nonetheless, why has AID not, why has the United States not conditioned its aid on a more equitable spreading of resources and a more equitable spreading of decisionmaking to regions of the country not favored by the central government?

Mr. BOLLINGER. Indeed, Senator, we have structured our aid program so that it has an impact on those elements of the population which are disadvantaged. Our Economic Assistance Program has been restructured to emphasize family planning, child survival programs aimed at reducing the infant mortality rate, and natural resources management.

Senator HUMPHREY. But that is not quite my question.

My question is, Why haven't we conditioned our aid on the equitable spreading of resources to those parts, those regions not favored by the central government?

Have we, in fact, done that?

Mr. BOLLINGER. We don't have the overall volume of resources to make that kind of conditioning credible.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you mean they'd tell us to "take a walk" if we told them that we conditioned our $10 million?

Mr. BOLLINGER. Well, I think it would be difficult to achieve, to negotiate the kind of objectives that you have described——

Senator HUMPHREY. Really?

Mr. BOLLINGER [continuing]. With the modest levels of assistance which we are making available.

Senator HUMPHREY. Then let's fall back on the fact that there are several hundred million dollars, in your estimate, of multilateral aid that could be used to leverage toward achieving that kind of conditioning, to spread these resources to the less favored, disfavored regions of the country, equitably. Is that not correct?

Mr. BOLLINGER. That's correct.

Senator HUMPHREY. So, you would agree with me?

Mr. BOLLINGER. I agree that those resources are available. I do not agree with you in terms of the likelihood of our being able to orchestrate agreement among the international donors.

Senator HUMPHREY. Really, why not? I mean, who is in favor of starvation?

Mr. BOLLINGER. If one looks at other countries in similar situations, in Ethiopia, at other kinds of situations of that nature, the other donor countries simply were not willing to take these kinds of positions.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, the fact is we keep seeing these photographs of children dead of starvation. I don't want to diminish what you have done. But whatever we have done as a country obviously is not enough. I think we have to find more effective means.

Mr. BOLLINGER. Also, I would just like to underscore that, as long as a number of Arab countries are willing to provide significant financial flows to Sudan, it puts them in a position where the aid that we provide is not as critical.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes, I understand that.

Do you want to pick up or do I have more time?

Senator SIMON. If I could just interrupt for two short questions, I would say that Senator Humphrey and I do not agree on everything, and he would be the first to say that very firmly. But I do think we ought to be using whatever leverage we have, perhaps a little greater firmness.

Let me ask, in that connection, this. I note that in fiscal year 1989, our total obligation or assistance was $77 million. Our request for fiscal year 1990 is $51 million.

I also note that in Malawi, with all the refugee problems from Mozambique, we had $23 million in fiscal year 1989, $21 million requested for fiscal year 1990, and this country, which has been a solid friend of the United States, faces all these, you know, 750,000 refugees, according to their estimates, because of the Mozambique civil war.

Ms. TAFT. If I may respond to a portion of that, the figures that you are quoting for Malawi represent only the AID funds. Major support for the Mozambican refugees in Malawi is funded through the Refugee Programs Bureau of the State Department in its contributions to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Senator SIMON. You wouldn't have the number offhand?

Ms. TAFT. I'll be glad to get it for you.

Senator SIMON. OK.

Ms. TAFT. That is possible.

[The information referred to follows:]

USG REFUGEE-RELATED ASSISTANCE

[in thousands of U.S. dollars]

	UNHCR						
	CY prog. orig	USG percent share	USG dollar share	USG desig.	USG bilat.	USG food aid	USG total contrib.
Malawi:							
Fiscal year 1980	0.5	28.4	0.1				0.1
Fiscal year 1981							
Fiscal year 1982							
Fiscal year 1983	1.1	33.3	0.4				
Fiscal year 1984	35.5	30.0	10.7				10.7
Fiscal year 1985	168.9	30.0	50.7				50.7
Fiscal year 1986	712.2	30.0	213.7				213.7
Fiscal year 1987	80.0	30.0	24.0	950.0	450.0	2,596.0	4,020.0
Fiscal year 1988	2,988.7	25.0	747.2	6,900.0	630.8	4,000.0	11,530.8
Fiscal year 1989							

Senator SIMON. What about in the case of Sudan?

Mr. BOLLINGER. Your question again, Mr. Senator, please?

Senator SIMON. Well, what you're saying is the $77 million, in the case of Sudan, the $77 million and $51 million does not include the refugee assistance.

Ms. TAFT. It doesn't include any of the disaster assistance that we fund. This is a point I wanted to follow up on with Senator Humphrey.

There was $75.5 million so far since February 1988. Now, the projections for next year depend on what the situation is.

We are looking now at an estimate of an additional $10 to $15 million that we will be putting into the emergency program of the Sudan between now and the end of the fiscal year. Those are not part of the DA or ESF accounts.

Senator SIMON. So, that I follow you, that brings us up to $71 million this fiscal year in disaster assistance?

Ms. TAFT. Well, it's a combination of disaster assistance, refugee money, and Food for Peace emergency food.

Senator SIMON. Now the $77 million includes the Public Law 480 fund? That includes $41 million?

What I would like to do is this. I don't follow the figures that I have here and the figures that we are getting now.

I do not expect this today, now, but if you could get me the totals, so that I can get a little firmer grasp on what Senator Humphrey is following on, and also what we are doing and some feel for what we should be doing, all right. I am interested both in the case of Sudan and Malawi, and I'd like the totals.

Mr. BOLLINGER. Right, including development assistance as well as emergency assistance for each country?

Senator SIMON. That is correct.

Mr. BOLLINGER. All right.

We can provide that.

Senator SIMON. Thank you.

[The information referred to follows:]

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON D.C. 20523

ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR

MAR 13

The Honorable Paul Simon, Chairman
Subcommittee on Africa
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Simon:

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before your Subcommittee on the important subject of urgent humanitarian relief to Sudan.

Please find enclosed with this letter the information that you requested concerning refugees in Malawi, Sudan and Ethiopia. I hope this material provides you with the needed information to complete your assessment of the Sudanese emergency situation.

If I can be of further service to you concerning this or other matters, please do not hesitate to call upon me.

Sincerely,

Walter G. Bollinger
Acting Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Africa

PROGRAM COMPARISON - MALAWI/SUDAN

ASSISTANCE SUMMARY: ($ Mils.)	FY 88		FY 89 EST.		FY 90 CP	
	Malawi	Sudan	Malawi	Sudan	Malawi	Sudan
DFA	22.8*	13.2	17.0	10.0	20.0	12.0
ESF	5.3	0	0	21.4**	0	10.0
DFA/ESF Subtotal	28.1	13.2	17.0	31.4	20.0	22.0
P.L. 480 Title I	0	40.0	0	30.0	0	20.0
Title II	3.9	14.0***	5.5	20.9***	0	3.4
P.L. 480 Subtotal	3.9	54.0	5.5	50.9	0	23.4
Peace Corps	1.8	0	2.1	0	2.6	0
IMET	.2	.9	.3	.9	.3	1.1
MAP	.5	0	.5	0	0	0
FMS		0	0	0	1.2	5.0
GRAND TOTAL	34.5	68.1	25.4	83.1	24.1	51.5

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*Includes $5.5 mil AEPRP.

**The FY 1989 ESF level includes $9.35 million of FY 1988 ESF which remains unobligated due to imposition of Brooke sanctions.

***Title II amounts for FY 1988 and 1989 include famine emergency food assistance which caused higher levels in those years. These figures also include the cost of transport

USG FUNDING FOR REFUGEES IN MALAWI/SUDAN/ETHIOPIA THROUGH UNHCR
($ millions)

1988			1989		
Malawi	Sudan	Ethiopia	Malawi	Sudan	Ethiopia
8.9	11.0	12.5	4.9	10.0	4.6

- Malawi figures refer to Mozambican refugees within Malawi.
- Sudan figures refer to Ethiopian, Ugandan, Chadian and other refugees within Sudanese borders.
- Ethiopia figures refer to Sudanese and Somali refugee assistance within Ethiopian territory.

Senator SIMON. Senator Humphrey.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you.

Mr. Brown, what role have the Soviets been playing in recent months relative to the crisis in Sudan?

Mr. BROWN. The Soviets, of course, are the primary supporters of Ethiopia. The Ethiopians are the primary supporters of the SPLA.

We have discussed with the Soviets the question of their influence on Ethiopia in regard to settlement of disputes in the region, both a political solution to Ethiopia's own wars and in regard to Ethiopia's support for the SPLA.

We have asked them to use their influence with the SPLA and we will see how that turns out.

But, as of right now, there hasn't been much.

Senator HUMPHREY. What was their response to our request?

Mr. BROWN. Well, in regard to the overall question of discussions on the Horn, they have been forthcoming. We will be talking to them about the Horn. I cannot say where that will lead.

We look at them as the leading country with influence on Ethiopia. As you know, we have very little influence with Ethiopia. This will be a central element of our discussions with them.

Senator HUMPHREY. Have we made a specific request to the Soviet Union that the Soviets use their "good offices"—is that an appropriate term—to secure through Ethiopia greater cooperation by the SPLA?

Have we made a specific request in connection with this hunger crisis, this starvation crisis?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, we have.

Senator HUMPHREY. You have.

What was their response?

Mr. BROWN. They are going to get back to us.

Senator HUMPHREY. They haven't responded?

Mr. BROWN. No.

Senator HUMPHREY. When was that request made?

Mr. BROWN. It was quite recent. It was within the last few weeks.

Senator HUMPHREY. What influence do the Soviets have with those unnamed Arab countries you cited, who are supporting the Khartoum government and, as you imply, subsidizing the Khartoum government in its policies that result in dead people, people who starve to death?

Mr. BROWN. I don't know that the Soviets have extensive influence with those countries.

Senator HUMPHREY. What countries are those?

Mr. BROWN. Sir, are we going to go into a closed meeting?

Senator SIMON. We will.

I might mention to Senator Humphrey that, following the public hearing, we will be going into a classified briefing.

Senator HUMPHREY. Fine. But why is that a secret?

Mr. BROWN. Well, I don't know that it's a secret. When we're getting into the question, the discussion of Sudan's support among its neighbors, I would prefer to discuss it in the other session.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, I will defer to the chairman on that, as I must, anyway.

Just one last question, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. **Brown**. I might say, sir, that it is, of course, public knowledge that the Libyans are supporting Sudan in the war in the south. I am not an expert on Soviet relations with Libya, though.

Senator **Humphrey**. Ms. Taft, you stated I think something to the effect that, unless a sufficient quantity of food is located, is inserted before the beginning of the rainy season in May, I guess it is, some 300,000 people will be at risk during the period of the rainy season.

Ms. **Taft**. That is our estimate—about 250,000 to 350,000.

Senator **Humphrey**. And the beginning of the rainy season is approximately May 1st?

Ms. **Taft**. Yes. That does not mean that there is a total cutoff of accessibility at that time.

Senator **Humphrey**. Well, where do we stand in regard to that imperative?

Ms. **Taft**. We have the food. Quite a lot is currently being prepositioned by CARE, using Sudanese Government-owned pounds to move it. The food is our Public Law 480 emergency food.

We are working on a swap arrangement to get some more sorghum. There have been recent agreements out of Kenya for the acquisition of additional maize, beans, and oil.

Senator **Humphrey**. I'm assuming that we can get the food and that the problem is transport.

Ms. **Taft**. Well, no, you cannot necessarily assume that, sir.

Senator **Humphrey**. No?

Ms. **Taft**. We are working on that.

Senator **Humphrey**. Well, what about transport and prepositioning?

Ms. **Taft**. Transport is primarily by aircraft. We have aircraft going out of Nairobi and out of Entebbe.

Senator **Humphrey**. Well, my point is are we going to be able to do it or not?

Ms. **Taft**. I don't know. I just don't know, sir.

Senator **Humphrey**. What percentage of the need has been prepositioned so far?

Ms. **Taft**. The only way we are actually going to be able to achieve a substantial prepositioning is by truck. The only way we can get surface transportation by truck is if we get some kind of agreement for an expanded ICRC operation or under the U.N. flag. I hope it will not take several months. The planes that we need to carry this much cargo cannot fit on the airstrips that are available. So, we have to have a cease-fire.

Senator **Humphrey**. So, the cease-fire is utterly essential——

Ms. **Taft**. Yes, and it has to be on both sides.

Senator **Humphrey** [continuing]. To prepositioning that food by May 1 and saving the lives of 300,000 people?

Ms. **Taft**. Yes, in my estimation.

Senator **Humphrey**. Then we'd better find some more leverage, it seems to me.

Ms. **Taft**. I think one aspect of this will be the U.N. conference and the kind of visibility that the problem gets, and the precision with which the donors and the U.N. present the options on what to do.

Senator **Humphrey**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Simon**. Senator Kassebaum, do you have any further questions?

Senator **Kassebaum**. No, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Senator **Simon**. If I could just add one word in connection with the meeting in Khartoum of UNICEF, it does seem to me that that is a place where the donor countries, either publicly or privately, make very, very clear to the government, to both sides, that we want to have, that we do not want to see starvation as a method of solving the military problem.

Ms. **Taft**. Absolutely.

Senator **Simon**. Thank you very, very much for your testimony.

Our final panel is Mr. John Prendergast, the Research Associate for the Center of Concern, and Mr. Roger Winter, the Director of the U.S. Committee for Refugees.

Again, I would say to our witnesses that we will enter your full statements into the record. We will put a 5-minute timer on you here and then we will have questions for you.

Mr. Prendergast.

STATEMENT OF JOHN PRENDERGAST, RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, CENTER OF CONCERN COALITION FOR PEACE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. **Prendergast**. Thank you very much for allowing public testimony.

I am cocoordinator of the newly formed Coalition for Peace in the Horn of Africa, an association of about 60 United States nongovernmental organizations, which have pledged to work on United States policy issues in Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia.

The formation of this coalition is a reflection of the growing concern on the part of many that the root causes of the crises facing the peoples of the Horn must begin to be addressed by U.S. policy, and that bandaids are no longer sufficient to salve the conscience of the U.S. public.

I would like to preface these remarks by saying that, whether or not there is a coup in Sudan in the next couple of weeks, the Coalition's recommendations would remain the same.

To his credit, Secretary of State James Baker has quickly abandoned the quiet diplomacy of his predecessor and begin exploring alternative ways of getting food into the south and identified peace as the No. 1 priority of U.S. policy in the Sudan.

These hopeful signs, however, are effectively neutralized by the U.S. Government's hesitation on taking the bold steps necessary to create the conditions for peace.

A State Department white paper issued 2 weeks ago repeats a fundamental misconception upon which U.S. policy has been based. "The scale of the suffering is so large," the paper states, "that causes of the war and goals of the combatants have become of secondary importance" to ending the conflict.

The problem with this is that these "causes" and "goals" have been of "secondary importance" to the United States and Sudanese Governments all along.

Peace cannot come and the suffering cannot be alleviated until these deeply felt grievances begin to be addressed not only inside Sudan but by donors supporting the Sudanese Government as well.

My written testimony outlines 10 myths currently guiding United States policy in Sudan. I will address just two of these real briefly, and then present an alternative U.S. policy which will be more supportive of the difficult processes of peace and unification.

One myth is that United States and multilateral assistance is helping the people of Sudan.

The voluminous amounts of foreign aid that continue to flow to the Government of Sudan from Western multilateral and bilateral sources does nothing but reinforce the structural and social inequities which produce conflict and disempower the masses, which, in turn, lead to increasing incidents of famine and instability.

With all the conditions attached to their aid, AID and the World Bank have never vigorously pursued the equitable spreading of resources to or local decisionmaking by the south, or other regions not favored by the central government. Nor have they consistently provided the types of aid that increase food self-sufficiency at the household and village levels.

Uninterrupted external assistance, as it is currently given from the West, strengthens Prime Minister Sadiq el Mahdi in his resolve to avoid a meaningful settlement of the conflict.

Another myth that I think is important to address and one that Deputy Secretary Brown mentioned is that the SPLA is the primary obstacle to peace.

With the signing of the SPLA-DUP peace accord, the only remaining opponents of a peaceful settlement to the conflict in the Sudan are the Muslim Brotherhood and el Mahdi's Umma Party, the two remaining members of the coalition government.

El Mahdi's intransigence in not implementing the agreement has angered all elements of Sudanese society and led to a renewed round of fighting in the field.

Constructive engagement is worthless with a leader like Sadiq el Mahdi. Just as in South Africa, candles may be placed in the windows and a fresh coat of paint may be applied to the front door, but conditions inside the house will continue to deteriorate.

As Sudan Times Editor Bona Malwal told me a couple of weeks ago, "The United States can say we don't want to continue supporting this intransigence and before they finish their sentence, the Prime Minister would be looking for a pen to sign the peace agreement."

It is in this spirit that I offer, on behalf of the Coalition, the following recommendations.

No. 1: condition all future United States assistance, except for humanitarian, to the Sudanese Government on the implementation of the peace agreement negotiated by the DUP and the SPLA, on the development of plans to redress regional resource inequities, on the initiation of processes of decentralization of decisionmaking, on the improvement of their human rights records, and on the reorientation of domestic budgets to decrease military spending and increase resources available for decentralized development.

No. 2: In light of the fact that multilateral economic assistance from the World Bank, IMF, and the U.N. are keeping this government afloat, we should instruct the U.S. representatives to the three multilateral institutions to work toward the same conditionalities in the interests of peace and future economic viability.

As a start, human rights improvements can be encouraged in accordance with Section 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act.

In the related case of Somalia, most of our allies have already conditioned future aid on peace, but the United States has not. This could be addressed in Sudan.

No. 3: Initiate planning for an internationally funded postwar reconstruction fund to be held in escrow until this present or a future government meets the conditions outlined in recommendation No. 1.

This fund would support the building of local institutions to sustain peace.

No. 4: Press for an international arms embargo for the region.

No. 5: Recognize the mutual interests of the United States and the Soviet Union in the free flow of oil. Begin negotiations directly with the Soviets to jointly protect the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden shipping lanes in order to render unnecessary the maintenance of base rights in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia. Work together with the Soviets in urging negotiated settlements to the conflicts in the Horn of Africa and in assisting civilians caught in the crossfire.

No. 6: Maximum participation of indigenous NGO's, nongovernmental organizations, and community organizations should be enlisted in the battle to combat the rapid deterioration of the environment and to increase the availability of locally produced foodstuffs.

No. 7: To make a strong commitment of food and medicine to the cross-border operation in southern Sudan, encouraging expansion into areas north of Kapoeta. Make the provision of seeds and tools and immediate priority before the rains begin with that people can produce for themselves again and not be held hostage to the government of SPLA relief operations as the sole options for survival.

Finally, Candidate Bush constantly reiterated his desire throughout the campaign to see a "kinder, gentler nation" emerge under his stewardship. President Bush has the opportunity to take his own cue in response to the cries of the hungry and oppressed in the Sudan. The values on which the United States was founded are exactly those which the United States should be projecting in its foreign policy toward this divided country: Freedom of religion and speech; constitutional protection of individual rights; access to productive resources in order that parents can feed themselves and their children; democratic decisionmaking; and, above all else, a government which will commit itself to a meaningful process of peace and reunification.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Prendergast follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN PRENDERGAST

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you all for allowing public testimony as part of this hearing on U.S. policy in Sudan. My name is John Prendergast. I am a policy analyst with the Center of Concern here in Washington, and I have recently returned from a five week fact-finding mission throughout rebel and government held territory in Sudan. I am also co-coordinator of the newly-formed Coalition for Peace in the Horn of Africa, an association of about 60 U.S. Non-Governmental Organizations which have pledged to work on U.S. policy issues in Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia. The formation of the Coalition is a reflection of the growing concern on the part of many that the root causes of the crises facing the peoples of the Horn must begin to be addressed by U.S. policy, and that band-aids are no longer sufficient to salve the conscience of the U.S. public.

By not openly and strongly challenging the racially, religiously, and economically discriminatory policies of their client in Khartoum, the previous U.S. Administration and multilateral organizations such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and United Nations' donor agencies unfortunately must be considered silent accessories to the systematic depopulation of vast areas of southern Sudan. But the latest egregious abuses perpetrated by the Sudanese government against civilians in the South are merely symptomatic of a radicalized leadership bent on centralizing control of all economic, religious, and political decision-making in the country.

To his credit, Secretary of State James Baker has quickly abandoned the quiet diplomacy of his predecessor, authorized the shipment of food into rebel-held areas of southern Sudan, and identified peace as the number one priority of U.S. policy in Sudan. These hopeful signs, however, are effectively neutralized by the U.S. government's hesitation on taking the bold steps necessary to create the conditions for peace.

First, a State Department White Paper issued two weeks ago repeats a fundamental misconception upon which U.S. policy has been based. "The scale of the suffering is so large," the Paper states, "that causes of the war and goals of the combatants have become of secondary importance" to ending the conflict. The problem with this is that these 'causes' and 'goals' have been of 'secondary importance' to the U.S. and Sudanese governments all along. Peace cannot come and the suffering cannot be alleviated until these deeply felt grievances begin to be addressed not only inside Sudan but by donors supporting the Sudanese government as well.

Secondly, the Bush Administration is in the process of developing its request for aid for Sudan for the coming fiscal year. More aid will not purchase more leverage at this point. A cease-fire could be achieved tomorrow in Sudan's civil war if international donors, led by the U.S., froze all aid (except emergency food and medicine) and conditioned its resumption of the achievement of peace within the country.

It is clearly in the long-term interest of multilateral donors and governments allied with the Sudan to sanction the Sudanese government for its unwillingness to sign the peace agreement negotiated by the insurgent Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the second largest political party in the country. In the absence of peace, debts cannot begin to be repaid, minerals cannot be extracted, people cannot feed themselves, and a stable government and economic system cannot be maintained.

A series of myths currently guiding U.S. policy in Sudan will be addressed in the following testimony. In the pursuit of peace in Sudan, it is critical that we understand the fundamental causes of the ongoing conflict, that we examine who and what are obstacles to its resolution, and that we develop an alternative U.S. policy which would be most supportive of the difficult process of peace and unification.

MYTH # 1: THE ISSUE OF ISLAMIC LAW IS THE PRIMARY CAUSE OF WAR

It is a widely held misconception that the imposition of Islamic Law in 1983 was the primary ignitive factor leading to the current conflict. In actuality, the series of mutinies in southern garrisons were the expression of years of increasing political and economic marginalization of all non-Muslim Africans inside the country, culminating in the division of the South by the central government into three new provinces, and the recentralization of most decision-making back to Khartoum.

The twin desires for localized control of resources and decentralized decision-making have been at the heart of every liberation movement in the Sudan since Independence. Despite the elaborate plans for exploitative "development" concocted for southern Sudan by multinationals, the U.S. Agency for International Development (A.I.D.), multilateral donor institutions, and elites in Khartoum, the lesson should have been learned over and over again by now that disenfranchised southern Sudanese are not weak peasants who will lie down and accept forcibly imposed economic and political schemes which serve to rape local resources and deprive people of the ability to determine their own development.

The diversity of cultures and aspirations of different segments of the Sudan's population makes complete authority concentrated in central government hands unsustainable and unacceptable to those on the periphery. As former Sudanese Foreign Minister Francis Deng has written, the "resistance to assimilation increases in direct proportion to the level of coercion applied" by the central government. Indeed, many of the negative connotations of 'tribalism' are directly resultant from colonial and post-colonial centralism. The arrogant processes of centralization would not have been and would not continue to be possible without massive, unquestioning assistance from the U.S. and other benefactors.

In summary, the imposition of Islamic Law in 1983 was and is not the primary cause of war. There are deep-seated political, economic, and cultural problems that must be addressed if our pursuit of peace is to be effective.

MYTH # 2: U.S. AND MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE IS HELPING THE PEOPLE OF SUDAN

The voluminous amount of foreign aid that continues to flow to the government of Sudan does nothing but reinforce the structural and social inequities which produce conflict and disempower the masses, which in turn leads to the increasing incidence of famine and instability. With all the conditions attached to their aid, A.I.D. and the World Bank have never vigorously pursued the equitable spreading of resources to, or local decision-making by, the South or other regions not favored by the central government. Nor have they consistently provided the types of aid that increase food self-sufficiency at the household and village levels. Uninterrupted external assistance as it is currently given from the West and from Arab governments strengthens Prime Minister Sadiq el Mahdi in his resolve to avoid a meaningful settlement of the conflict in Sudan.

The Sudanese government is currently spending an estimated $1 million a day on the war, a level which clearly could not be sustained with foreign exchange earned by exporting cotton, livestock, and sesame. The U.S., Middle Eastern, and European governments have provided the means to continue the conflict well past the stage where a self-supporting government would have had to negotiate solutions or crumble under the weight of broad-based opposition.

The current leadership in Sudan needs Western investment capital and aid to keep its artificial economy and privileged status intact. Whenever the flow of that capital has seemed endangered, former President Nimieri and current Prime Minister el Mahdi have cunningly used the Libyan alternative and the Soviet threat to keep the U.S. credit line flowing. The U.S government has been and continues to be bluffed and strung along by successive Sudanese governments invoking the specter of communist encroachment.

Astute analysts of the 1984-85 famine in Sudan attribute government policy which allowed large landowners and foreign-owned agribusiness to take over land previously tilled by smallholders as one of the primary reasons for the huge number of deaths by starvation. Massive amounts of money have been given in the interests of increased production to assist these mechanized ventures, as well as to the Gezeira cotton schemes, one of the government's main sources of income and a major base of support for el Mahdi. This type of aid looks good on paper because it leads to increased aggregate output and foreign exchange, but it clearly reinforces the economic domination of central government and agribusiness elites and the impoverishment of those marginalized in the process.

A quick word about the multilateral institutions....

The Sudan is currently over $800 million in arrears to the IMF and its total external debt is over $12 billion. The strings the IMF attaches to new cash infusions impact most strongly on the environment and the rural poor, usually women and children first. Larry Minear of Church World Service notes that "conditions often work against efforts by the people themselves to meet local needs." The pressure to increase export crops by mechanized farming often results in deforestation and soil erosion. Mohammed T. El-Ashry of the World Resources Institute has said,

> Massive environmental degradation is going on right now in the Sudan due to mechanized farming in the West and opening lands which should not have been opened to ploughing and tilling. As a result, you get basically short-term productivity.

Unfortunately, Sudanese farmers will be left with long-term destitution.

Similarly, the World Bank conditions its aid on things like changing the tax and tariff system, realigning exchange rates, and streamlining public enterprises. Without beginning to address issues like military spending and structural economic inequities which lead to conflict, none of the Bank's economic or developmental objectives can ever be achieved, no matter how many times the Sudanese devalue their currency.

The United Nations has received much attention for its diplomatic successes in other conflicts throughout the world. A bi-partisan effort has begun in the Senate to enlist the Secretary General as a mediator between the warring parties in the Sudan. Although this is a noble goal, a word of caution is needed. The U.N. has only been successful when both sides of the table have something to gain from peace. As long as foreign aid continues to flow in unconditioned on the achievement of peace, Sadiq el Mahdi has nothing to gain from any substantive agreement, and will delay interminably.

MYTH # 3: THE U.S NEEDS NAVAL ACCESS TO PORT SUDAN TO DETER ANY POSSIBLE SOVIET THREAT TO RED SEA SHIPPING LANES

Over the past decade and a half, the driving forces behind U.S. policy towards the Horn of Africa have been fear and containment. State and Defense Department strategists built the U.S. Central Command, in which Sudan and Somalia have been integral players, on the premise that the Soviet Union and its proxies in the region might at some point attempt to restrict the flow of Mid-East oil to the West.

Recent developments render these assumptions anachronistic.

First, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that the Soviet Union will have to begin importing oil in the coming decade. Already Warsaw Pact countries are importing much of their fossil fuel requirements from Arab sources. This hardly makes for a scenario in which the Soviets would want to cut off a potentially major source for its energy needs. A recent case in point is the decision by the Soviets not to interfere with the U.S. reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers in the Gulf War.

Second, Soviet forces are in the process of disengaging from their Afghani quagmire, an original reason for the proliferation of military aid to Somalia and Sudan in the late seventies. South Yemen has greatly moderated its anti-West tendencies, and will begin to export oil in the early 1990's. In Ethiopia, Mengistu has recently called for improved relations with the United States, and has been told by his Soviet benefactors that the days of unlimited arms transfers are finished. The anti-West umbrella has folded.

Third, increasingly unstable and narrowly based regimes in Somalia and Sudan, once staunch and reliable U.S. allies, now present a greater threat to long-term U.S. interests than does the Soviet Union. The very presence of the Soviet Union in the region is threatened by Ethiopia's unwillingness to negotiate with the increasingly potent Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), an avowed opponent of military base rights for any outside power in the Dahlak Archipelago.

It seems that U.S. taxpayers and famine victims in the Sudan have at least one thing in common: they are both being used by their governments to acheive narrowly conceived military and economic goals which benefit only a select few.

MYTH # 4: WESTERN BILATERAL AID TO SUDAN COUNTERS LIBYAN EXPANSIONISM

As long as Prime Minister el Mahdi does not fear the possibility of a cut-off of assistance from the West, he feels free to impose his personally held Fundamentalist Islamic conviction on the country. El Mahdi conveniently cites as his excuse the strong influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Khartoum and in his coalition government. This allows him to pursue a special relationship with Colonel Khadaffy, which places the U.S. in the peculiar position of vainly bidding for influence with Tripoli in both Sudan and Somalia.

It is obvious to observers outside the Beltway and the U.S.

Embassy in Khartoum that Libya does not possess the resources to replace investment and aid that the West has to offer el Mahdi's government. So the absurd irony remains that Western aid not conditioned on a perceived need to decrease Libyan influence in fact paves the way for increased Libyan influence.

MYTH # 5: SUDAN'S ECONOMY IS STILL VIABLE

In an unsuccessful mid-December bid to induce el Mahdi to sign the SPLA-DUP peace agreement, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Ken Brown offered the Prime Minister debt rescheduling on more favorable terms. What will this narrowly based government repay with - cotton? In a war economy? The answer to Sudan's debt and financial crisis lies in the slumbering economic giant of the South - gold, oil, chromium, and vast agricultural productive potential. But these resources cannot be forcibly taken (as Chevron and Jonglei Canal project workers found out) from the southerners. Southerners need to participate in defining the pace and benefit-sharing of the extensive development that will be undertaken after the war, and they must have a say in controlling the environmental impacts of development and mineral extraction, a matter in which the central government clearly has no interest.

MYTH # 6: THE U.S. IS DEFENDING A DEMOCRACY IN SUDAN

Democracy does indeed seem to exist for those in the Sudan who are not running from U.S. tanks and Libyan-supplied MIG-23s. Nevertheless, freedom of speech and the press are not so comfortably cherished in the presence of state-sponsored ethnic and religious discrimination, child slavery, intense civil war, and massive starvation and displacement.

MYTH # 8: THE SPLA IS THE PRIMARY OBSTACLE TO PEACE

With the signing of the SPLA-DUP peace accord, the only remaining opponents of a peaceful settlement to the conflict are the Muslim Brotherhood and el Mahdi's Umma Party, the two remaining members of the coalition government. El Mahdi's intransigence in not implementing the agreement has angered all elements of Sudanese society, and led to a renewed round of fighting in the field.

During my recent travels in Sudan, I found many Sudanese at all levels to be skeptical of the intentions of the Prime Minister regarding his commitment to any meaningful process of reconciliation with the SPLA. The following reasons constantly emerged: 1) El Mahdi believes he can win the war militarily by wearing down the SPLA and battering the South into submission through his use of hostile militias and hunger as weapons of war; 2) The atmosphere in the country is desirous of peace, meaning that el Mahdi and his privileged Umma Party would have the most to lose in an equitable settlement; 3) The Prime Minister privately wishes to reestablish the primacy of the Mahdi family, which freed the country form the Turko-Egyptian rule at the end of the last century; 4) In any lasting settlement, Islamic law would be ruled out as the basis for the legal code in the society; 5) The war gives el Mahdi and the Muslim Brotherhood financial and military support from radicalized factions in the Middle East which they would not receive if Islam was not "under attack", as the situation is portrayed effectively in certain circles; and 6) The war is very profitable for merchants, transport companies, and other commercial interests tied to the Umma Party which are making enormous amounts of money off of the relief efforts.

It is for these compelling reasons el Mahdi will not come to the negotiating table unless the continuance of his economic lifeline from the West is made conditional on the achievement of peace.

MYTH # 9: WAR CAUSES FAMINE

The war in Sudan could have been fought over the last few years with very limited deaths by starvation. The overwhelming bulk of the almost 300,000 who perished last year died because of specific tactics undertaken by the government and SPLA in their prosecution of the war.

Government forces have armed ethnic groups traditionally hostile to the Dinkas, the backbone of the SPLA, predictably causing widespread massacres of unarmed Dinka civilians. Food has been used cynically by both sides as a weapon of war, as have land mines to either trap people inside government garrison towns or keep them out in rebel-held territory. Reports of slavery are alleged against both the government and the SPLA. Civilian targets have been bombed and strafed as well.

More than any other in recent history, this famine was preventable. Yet the U.S. government was silent.

MYTH # 10: U.S. AND SOVIET INTERESTS ARE DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED IN THE HORN REGION

Hostile policies of containment by both superpowers have resulted in far greater costs than benefits in Africa's Horn. Millions of lives and billions of dollars have bought nothing but instability. By defining security solely in terms of force levels and access to military bases instead of factoring in the promotion of just and equitable economic, social, and political structures, the U.S. and Soviets are left supporting unreliable, opportunistic, and increasingly oppressive governments in Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia whose futures beyond tomorrow cannot be assured.

With a little foresight, it is possible to see that the Soviet Union and the U.S. would be better off working together in northeast Africa rather than continuing their rivalry. By directly negotiating agreements to jointly protect the Red Sea shipping lanes, they will find it unnecessary to continuously bail out untenable Horn governments. Access to oil would be more reliably assured, and the superpowers could be freed to push jointly for just resolutions of the conflicts damning the people of Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia to unending destitution.

Perestroika may not last forever. In the interest of ending human suffering, the U.S. and Soviets should place the Horn of Africa on the top of the list of regional issues to address over the coming year. Cooperation not only in ensuring mutual interests but also in famine relief and post-war reconstruction in all three countries could provide a model for future negotiations in other regions of the world. Outside parties which help create the conditions for war must learn to work cooperatively toward creating external conditions for sustainable peace.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS

Constructive engagement is worthless with a leader like Sadiq el Mahdi. Just as in South Africa, candles may be placed in the windows and a fresh coat of paint may be applied to the front door, but conditions inside the house will continue to deteriorate. As Sudan Times Editor Bona Malwal told me a couple of weeks ago, "The U.S. can say we don't want to continue supporting this intransigence and before they finish their sentence Sadiq would be looking for a pen to sign the peace agreement." It is in this spirit that I offer the following recommendations:

1. Condition all future U.S. assistance (except for humanitarian) to the Sudanese government on the implementation of the peace agreement negotiated by the DUP and the SPLA, on the development of plans to redress regional resource inequities, on the initiation of processes of decentralization of decision making, on the improvement of their human rights record, and on the reorientation of domestic budgets to decrease military spending and increase resources available for decentralized development.

2. Instruct the U.S. representatives to the U.N., World Bank, and IMF to work towards the same conditionalities in the interests of peace and future economic viability. As a start, human rights improvements can be encouraged in accordance with Section 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act.

3. Initiate planning for an internationally funded Post-War Reconstruction Fund to be held in escrow until this present or a future government meets the conditions outlined in Recommendation # 1. This Fund would support the building of local institutions to sustain peace.

4. Press for an international arms embargo of the region.

5. Recognize the mutual interests of the U.S. and Soviet Union in the free flow of oil. Begin negotiations directly with the Soviets to jointly protect the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden shipping lanes in order to render unnecessary the maintenance of base rights in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia. Work together with the Soviets in urging negotiated settlements to the conflicts in the Horn of Africa and in assisting civilians caught in the cross-fire.

6. Maximum participation of indigenous NGOs and community organizations should be enlisted in the battle to combat the rapid deterioration of the environment and increase the availability of locally produced foodstuffs.

7. Make a strong commitment of food and medicine to the cross-border operation in southern Sudan, encouraging expansion into areas north of Kapoeta. Make the provision of seeds and tools an immediate priority before the rains begin so some can begin to produce for themselves again and not be hostage to the government or SPLA relief operations as the sole options for survival.

UPHOLDING AMERICAN PRINCIPLES ABROAD

Candidate Bush constantly reiterated his desire throughout the campaign to see a "kinder, gentler nation" emerge under his stewardship. President Bush has the opportunity to take his own cue in response to the cries of the hungry and oppressed in the Sudan. The values which the United States was founded on are exactly those which the U.S. should be projecting in its foreign policy toward this divided country: freedom of religion and speech; constitutional protection of individual and ethnic rights; access to productive resources in order that parents can feed themselves and their children; democratic decision-making; and above all else, a government which will commit itself to a meaningful process of peace and reunification.

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify.

Senator SIMON. Thank you.

Mr. Winter.

STATEMENT OF ROGER P. WINTER, DIRECTOR, U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. WINTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a problem which has been a long time in coming. It is a problem in which the basic framework of the humanitarian issues was known a year ago. It's a problem that has been almost byzantine in trying to sort out how to respond on both the peace issues and the humanitarian issues.

I'd like to focus on the humanitarian issues, but associate myself with many of the comments that John Prendergast just made.

I would like to suggest is that you take a look at the map at the back of my testimony. In trying to approach the needs of the victims of this conflict, it is convenient to divide them into four different groups.

The first are those who are civilians in the SPLA-held zones. I have taken the liberty of marking on that map cities and towns which are controlled by the SPLA. But you should understand that most of the white space in between all those locations is also controlled by the SPLA.

Senator SIMON. And the ones that are controlled by the SPLA are marked in yellow?

Mr. WINTER. They are marked in yellow. Yes, sir.

The total area may well be the size of Uganda. We are talking about a substantial land mass. We're talking about comparatively sparse populations, but some significant population concentrations.

Kapoeta is one. You see it near the border with Kenya. It is one that is easily reachable. It has perhaps 110,000 people there, located in 22 feeding sites, which are spread over a broad area. It happens to be the one area within the SPLA-controlled zone which has been regularly supplied with food for a period of time.

I have had the great fortune to be able to see it 7 months ago, see it again 10 days ago, and observe the difference that regular, adequate supplies of food make to very starving people. The difference was like night and day.

The second group of people in the south, in very difficult circumstances, are those who are in government-controlled, garrison towns. The most famous are in the very south. They are Torit and Juba.

Torit is a town which has been under siege for a long time, and if I were to hazard a prediction, it won't survive much longer in terms of being in government control.

Juba is the capital of the south. There may be as many as a quarter of a million displaced people in and around Juba. There are supplies going in there, but they are all too limited. They are not really distributed to the people that need them in an adequate way.

Last week, in one of the few military initiatives undertaken by the government this dry season, a convoy was sent to relieve Torit. It was brigade sized and left a week ago Tuesday. It left Juba, was engaged by the SPLA, and massively mauled, ultimately returning to Juba.

It is likely that there will be no further possibility to relieve the food situation in Torit, although there are very few civilians there.

If I were to make a prediction, I would suggest that before this rainy season, in the not too distant future, Torit will fall. That will increase the pressure on Juba.

The SPLA has artillery. They have lobbed a few shells into Juba. You can envision the tightening of the noose in Juba taking place over the next couple of months. You can see civilians trying to bleed out in all directions. It is terribly important that we improve cross-border operations from Kenya, from Uganda, and other locations, if necessary to meet this emerging possibility.

The third group is those civilians in the transitional zone, the kind that Julia Taft and others have mentioned here, on whose behalf the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and other have been trying to pump in resources. Frankly, we commend them for their efforts. This group, unfortunately, is subject to massive, undisciplined violence at the hands of government-supplied militias. Perhaps when all is said and done, this will be shown to be the genie that was let out of the bottle. It may be, when the government provided arms to these people, that they created an element that will turn out to be a great impediment to an ultimate ceasefire, at least in that particular area.

The fourth group, Mr. Chairman, is the million and a half displaced southerners in Khartoum.

I must tell you that in some ways this is the most tragic group of all. There are a million and a half displaced southerners in Khartoum. There are no security problems there. There are no logistical problems there. You don't have to have armed convoys to bring food into those people. They didn't just arrive last week, or last month In many cases, they have been there for a year.

And yet, for all practical purposes, nothing, in terms of relief supplies, nothing that constitutes an adequate package, is being made available for them or is being facilitated by the government.

Frankly, Senators, this group may well be the bellwether that we should watch to understand what the intentions of that government are with respect to displaced southern civilians.

I would like to make one last comment, perhaps on U.S. Government policy.

There is no question that we've seen a lot of progress in the last few weeks in terms of articulated policy. But I must confess that I am still concerned that the United States is approaching this crisis too tentatively, perhaps too geopolitically in the way we are viewing the issues.

What I mean by that is even though we say it is our intention to meet the needs of civilians in both zones, as of yet, no U.S. Government official has set foot inside the SPLA area to see what the situation of civilians is there.

I take that as a sign that maybe our current approach remains a little bit too tentative and needs to be beefed up.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Winter follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROGER P. WINTER

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your willingness to consider the views of the U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR) on the current humanitarian crisis in the Sudan.

Unlike the Ethiopian crisis of several years ago, the tragedy that is Sudan today is entirely man-made. I returned from east Africa just days ago, where my primary focus was on southern Sudan. I can assure you that, while there has been a lot of talk recently about humanitarian needs in that region, and while the U.S. approach to issues of peace and humanitarian need in Sudan has improved perceptively in the last several months, the truth is that on the ground, where the victims are, little has yet changed. And the rains that will make adequate relief efforts immeasurably more difficult, if not impossible, in some locations are only weeks away.

Frankly, someone should write a book on how difficult it has been for this humanitarian emergency, despite its enormity, to come to world attention. We simply should not be working against the tight deadline we now face. The dimensions of the escalating problem were known by the appropriate people in our government and other governments more than a year ago. The spectacle of tens of thousands of emaciated young Dinka men making an extraordinary trek in early 1988 hundreds of miles from Bahr El Ghazal to western Ethiopia, leaving thousands of their dead along the route, was a hard indicator for the international community to miss.

The media, though in most cases slow to catch on, did catch on. The Atlanta Constitution was on top of the story. The Boston Globe provided excellent coverage. Jim Bitterman and NBC television provided all the visual coverage necessary to trigger the outpouring of human empathy for which the American people have become known. House and Senate staff provided key validation of the media reports and strong advocacy. Congressman Wolf made the effort and took the risk to see for himself. The numbers of known dead were enough to stagger anyone's sensibilities.

We saw in the matter of the tragic earthquake in Armenia how quickly and passionately the American government and people can respond. Yet somehow, tragically, despite the best efforts of many including the Office of Foreign

Disaster Assistance, in the case of Sudan we are now reduced to racing the calendar.

The civilian population still at risk is very large. It may be usefully described by dividing it into four categories.

The first grouping consists of those who are in civilian concentrations within the SPLA-held zone. Sudan is a very large country, but in the very south, the population is comparatively light. Still, some authorities suggest the SPLA-held territory is about the size of the entire country of Uganda. Within that area, civilian concentrations do exist. The best known is at Kapoeta, close to the Kenya border. There, over 100,000 displaced people inhabit twenty-two feeding sites scattered over a wide area. They are being assisted by a private relief agency, the Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), and have been since last year. World Vision is now an important partner in this operation. Having visited Kapoeta last summer and also two weeks ago, I have had the unique opportunity of seeing how the starving displaced population there has been rehabilitated through a reliable, adequate food supply. Thousands of lives have been saved. Unfortunately, though much is known, no one yet has a comprehensive picture of the needs of civilians elsewhere in the the SPLA-held zone, though the SPLA and its humanitarian relief affiliate, the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (SRRA), seem increasingly eager to have relief initiatives implemented and expanded. The Sudan government has been consistently hostile to efforts to feed civilians in SPLA-held areas. However, several locations have been supplied as part of a package deal between the government, the SPLA, and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Other cross-border operations into Sudan will be an indispensable component of an adequate total response.

The second category concerns those located in and around government-held garrison towns in the south. Although there are a number of these, perhaps the best known are Juba, the capital of the south, and Torit. The military initative for some months has clearly been with the SPLA; a half dozen garrison towns have fallen since last autumn. With each government loss, the pressure on Torit and Juba increases.

I had the opportunity to interview deserters from the government garrison at Torit two weeks ago. While I cannot vouch for the accuracy of what those deserters report, they unequivocably claim there are only a handful of civilians left at Torit. The others have leaked out over the last year to Kapoeta, to Juba, and some to Uganda.

By some estimates, there are 250,000 civilians in and around Juba. Government efforts to feed these civilians have been negligible. Only the World Food Program and private relief agencies have been doing this necessary task, and recently these efforts have been somewhat curtailed.

Early last week, in one of the very few government military initiatives this dry season, a brigade-sized convoy left Juba enroute for Torit. The SPLA reports it destroyed much of the convey, that the remnants were ordered back to Juba, and that, in the process, the government garrison at Lirya was taken. If this is the case, it appears only a matter of time before the government garrison at Torit falls, likely with serious implications for the stability of the government in Khartoum. Should that happen, it can be expected that the situation at Juba will tighten quickly. We should also anticipate significant numbers of civilians will seek to leave Juba, particularly if artillery shelling, which has now begun, becomes common. I believe we should all be working hard now to plan for this possibility, and specifically preparing to handle the complexities of internal transport of relief supplies that will likely become the major problem. The Norwegian People's Aid/World Vision relief operation is well-positioned to respond to this eventuality if adequate resources are made available.

The third grouping consists of civilians in insecure but government-held areas in the transition zone between north and south. I am personally less knowledgeable about this population, but do wish to offer one comment. It is these areas that have been affected by violence caused by indisciplined militias armed by the government of Sudan. It is in these areas that the most flagrant of human rights abuses have occurred and in which gratuitous violence has become common. It may well be that the government let the genie out of the bottle when it armed these elements. In practice, they will make the cease-fire we all hope for extremely difficult to achieve. It will be impossible to entirely disarm these populations. It is likely the arms the government has handed out will kill for decades. Any relief operation must navigate this exceedingly complex situation. It is in these areas that U.S.-sponsored relief efforts have been most visible.

The circumstances in which the fourth group exist are, frankly, the hardest to comprehend. There are a million-and-a-half displaced southerners in and around Khartoum, living the most wretched existence conceivable in their own capital city, many encamped on a garbage dump.

Mr. Chairman, there are no impassable roads to this population. There are no insecure zones. There is no SPLA to foil the attempt of the government or the international community to respond to the humanitarian needs of this population. These people did not just arrive in Khartoum. They have been there for months, in most cases for more than a year. Yet to this day virtually nothing has been done to assist them. This group is the ultimate indicator of the Sudan government's intentions towards displaced southerners.

Since last summer, a long chain of observers has passed through Sudan. All have criticized both the government and the SPLA for the use of food as a weapon of war in this conflict. But, it should be noted carefully, virtually all--journalists, relief officials, congressional staff, and even U.S. government officals when speaking off the record--have remarked about the disinterest, even hostility, many in the Sudan government exhibit when confronted with the need to respond to these displaced southern Sudanese.

Personally, I have been deeply disturbed by the tentative nature of the U.S. response to the humanitarian situation in Sudan during the last year. There is no question that this response has improved qualitatively recently. I am concerned, however, that it remains too tentative. The statement by Secretary of State Baker on February 7 was superb. Fielding the assessment team was an excellent initiative. But, having now observed the process closely for months, I am concerned that the U.S. response still remains too tentative.

While many in the Administration are truly exercised over the matter, to this day no Executive Branch official has, to my knowledge, stepped foot inside the SPLA-controlled areas of Sudan. Visiting some of these areas is safe and logistically simple. One can see, touch, talk to victims of this catastrophe in Sudan, even see those who have already been assisted by others. This long-term avoidance makes one wonder about the depth and strength of the U.S. commitment to assist all needy civilians in Sudan, even those in the SPLA-held zones.

I am sorry to have to be argumentative on this point. But if we could openly assist civilians in both zones in the Ethiopian situation of 1984-5, we can do so here. If the government in Khartoum cannot fathom an even-handed humanitarian initiative for its starving displaced southern citizens, the U.S. should seriously reconsider its relationship with that government. This situation is too big and too bad. The United States simply can no longer risk being anything but entirely straightforward and even-handed about the humanitarian issues involved.

The same is true on the peace front. It is important for the United States to shed the geopolitical glasses through which it has viewed this situation, until recently, and to recognize that, while exterior interests have played a role in this conflict, the struggle is essentially between Sudanese. A U.S. role of energetic, honest peace broker, seeking to preserve democratic institutions in Sudan while responding to the just grievances of the south, is exactly where our government should be positioned.

Thank you.


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Dongola
Merowe
Atbara
Shendi
Eritrea
Massawa
Keren
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Asmara
Omdurman
KHARTOUM
Darfur
Kordofan
El Obeid
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Gessan
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Roseires
Blue Nile
White Nile
Abyei
Bentiu
Kodok
Malakal
Kafia Kingi
Aweil
Raga
Tonga
Nasir
Ayod
ADDIS ABABA
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Gambela
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ZAIRE
UGANDA
KENYA
Lake Albert
Lake Rudolf

Source: The Minority Rights Group

Yellow = SPLA held

Senator SIMON. Thank you, Mr. Winter.

If I may ask you first, when you say it is too tentative, if you were writing a speech for Jim Baker, our new Secretary of State, what would you have him say?

Mr. WINTER. First let me say that I thought the statement he made the other day was quite good, superb. The administration needs to be commended for that.

Frankly, the government in Khartoum is the problem. Our Government's close relations with that government, the desire, which is admirable, to see democratic institutions preserved, has made the United States, at least in my opinion, swallow too much, too long, of what has been unacceptable behavior on the part of that government with respect to its own victim citizens from the south.

I think we should not necessarily tie our star or our view of the situation in Sudan to the Sadiq government per se. It is a very unstable government.

If Torit falls, and I am suggesting it may well fall in the not too distant future, or even sooner—as you know of the military initiatives within the last few days—you may have a change of government there.

To me, we need to try to preserve democratic institutions. We need to try to see that a system is put in place which recognizes and responds to the legitimate grievances that come from the south. But we have to do it with a mindset that prepares to cut loose that particular government if its recalcitrance continues.

I think that is one thing that I would suggest. There needs to be a different mindset in the way we approach this issue.

Senator SIMON. Mr. Prendergast, you mentioned that you are coordinator for a newly formed coalition of about 60 nongovernmental organizations. I don't expect you to recite all 60, but that includes which, for example?

Mr. PRENDERGAST. For example, there are groups like Church World Service and Bread for the World; Development Group for Alternative Policies; Amnesty International; Africa Faith and Justice Network; and most of the major denominational groups that are operating in the United States.

I could submit a list also for the record if it would be helpful to you.

Senator SIMON. OK.

[The information referred to follows:]

Among the NGO's who participate in coalition activities are the following: Amnesty International; Human Rights Watch; Bread for the World; Church World Service; Development Group for Alternative Policies; Africa Faith and Justice Network; TransAfrica; United Church of Christ; MaryKnoll; Refugee Policy Group; Results; Carter Center; U.S. Committee on Refugees; Mennonite Central Committee; Interfaith Action for Economic Justice; U.S. Catholic Conference; Network; Rainbow Lobby; Grassroots International; and Oxfam.

Senator SIMON. Let me add that these are groups I have all worked with. But I am sure there might be some in the Government who would say these primarily represent Christian interests and it is, to some extent, a Moslem-Christian struggle.

How would you respond to that?

Mr. PRENDERGAST. I think many of these groups in the coalition have shown kind of a consistent concern for human rights all over the world, whether it is in Southeast Asia or Latin America. I don't think it has ever mattered to most of them whether an oppressed group is Christian, Muslim, or of whatever faith.

I think that the record speaks for itself with most of the groups.

Senator SIMON. Mr. Prendergast's statement is a little more clear on precisely where we ought to go, Mr. Winter, than perhaps yours is. I earlier asked two of the previous witnesses this question: If George Bush were to say to you what specifically should we do, you would say what?

Mr. WINTER. Well, as I said at the beginning of my testimony, I associate myself with many of the comments that John made in terms of the peace issues. My focus was specifically to talk to the humanitarian issues. That is why I didn't dwell on it.

Fundamentally, we have not shown ourselves, in my opinion, at this point, ready to use the leverage we do have. While it is the case that our direct bilateral assistance has been going down over the last few years, and, while it may be the case that many other donors that operate through multilateral agencies often do not wish to go along with restricting of funds from those multilateral sources, I certainly do not see why we should not initiate that discussion and push it very hard, if that becomes the most effective thing in this situation.

Senator SIMON. I don't want to be putting words into your mouth, but you are suggesting that the same kind of role that Chet Crocker played in the Angola-Namibia thing is the kind of role we ought to be trying to pursue here in the Sudan?

Mr. WINTER. I think that that is exactly correct.

I think that the comments, the statement of Secretary Baker, indicate that the United States will take an energetic, peace-brokering role in this situation. That is exactly where we ought to be.

Senator SIMON. Senator Humphrey.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have the same question to each of our witnesses to begin with.

The administration witnesses feel that the starvation and the malnutrition are the result of—what word did they use—the result of ineptitude on the part of both belligerents.

Mr. Prendergast, is that your view, or has, in fact, you stated I think in your testimony—or perhaps it was Mr. Winter's testimony—that hunger and starvation had been used deliberately by both sides.

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Yes.

I think one of the most interesting things in terms of the coverage and understanding of famine over the last year in the media and in forums like these is that people have gone beyond the point of just saying that natural occurrences cause famine. People are starting to see that war causes famine.

I go further in my testimony in myth No. 9 to say that even in this situation, war itself is not what causes famine. If I may, I would read just very quickly what I want to say.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Mr. PRENDERGAST. The war in Sudan could have been fought over the last few years with very limited deaths by starvation. The overwhelming bulk of the almost 300,000 who perished last year died because of specific tactics undertaken by the government and the SPLA in their prosecution of the war.

Government forces have armed ethnic groups traditionally hostile to the Dinkas, the backbone of the SPLA, predictably causing widespread massacres of unarmed Dinka civilians. Food has been used cynically by both sides as a weapon of war, as have land mines, to either trap people inside government-garrisoned towns or keep them out in rebel-held territory.

Reports of slavery are alleged against both the government and SPLA and civilian targets have been bombed and strafed as well.

More than any other in recent history, I think, this famine was preventable. Yet the U.S. Government was silent.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is a very clear and unequivocal statement. Thank you for refreshing our memory on that.

You are saying, then, just to simplify it, that food, or the withholding of food, has been used by both sides deliberately, to the point of starvation and death?

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Many of the groups that are on the ground in government-held territory in the south have alleged those things. People that are working in the field have said that Sudanese officials on the ground in those towns have sold American-supplied medicines on the open market, have diverted food, have stored food and then sold it at higher prices later. And then, in Khartoum, much more clearly, much of the negotiations to get food into certain areas has been obstructed and allowed to linger on and on, until, finally, the ICRC was able to get an agreement to get some food into some parts of the south.

But I would say very clearly—and I think many people would corroborate that who have witnessed it on the ground, and especially I just spent 5 weeks in southern Sudan, and most of my time I spent talking to Sudanese refugees—that there was food available in many of these places and it just was not being distributed.

Senator HUMPHREY. I want to be clear on this point.

Has there been starvation as a deliberate policy on the part of both belligerents?

Mr. PRENDERGAST. I will say this. I cannot enter into the minds of some of the government officials who had control over the policies over the last 6 months in terms of getting food into southern Sudan. But it seems very clear from the tactics, the war tactics that were used, that were not necessarily the war tactics needed to win a war, that you can then make the assumption that they, in fact, wanted to depopulate much of the bulk of southern Sudan so that it would be very much easier to prosecute their war.

I think that that would be indicative that there is, in fact, genocide. That is a word that has been used by a number of people recently.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, was the intent to depopulate through forcing migration or simply starving people to death?

Mr. PRENDERGAST. The migration is usually the first step. People just run for their lives, or walk for their lives, or crawl for their lives. That is what has happened, the mass of exodus of people out of these towns.

So, whether you withhold food and watch somebody starve or withhold food and they leave and then starve on the road to Ethiopia is the same thing, I think.

Senator **Humphrey**. So, starvation has been accepted, in any event? It has been accepted?

Mr. **Prendergast**. Accepted—by whom?

Senator **Humphrey**. By the government. We're talking about the government, now, aren't we?

Mr. **Prendergast**. Well, I don't want to say that officials, all officials, on the ground in the Sudanese Government have accepted this as a policy. But I would say that yes, indeed, it was part of a de facto Sudanese Government policy, as a tactic, as a strategy, of war.

Senator **Humphrey**. So, migration or starvation did not seem to matter much. Is that what you are saying?

Mr. **Prendergast**. I think that is clear.

Senator **Humphrey**. Mr. Winter, what are your observations on this important point?

Mr. **Winter**. On this issue, I have to say that from the SPLA side, I am not aware of deliberate actions intended to starve civilians. I am not aware of that.

There is no question that the SPLA has interdicted supplies that would have had a benefit for civilians. But, as a conscious policy, I am not aware of it.

In terms of the government, I think there are some relatively clear incidents where people in the power structure at one level or another have taken actions to deny food to displaced southerners, within areas that they control, which have had the effect of starving people out.

There seems to be evidence in the government-held areas which is a lot clearer.

Senator **Humphrey**. And the government was willing to accept that starvation, in your opinion?

Mr. **Winter**. I think there is no question that they did accept in a number of cases the deaths of southern civilians as a necessary cost or a cost in the way they conducted the war.

Senator **Humphrey**. I see.

I want to talk for a moment about the million and a half southerners displaced at Khartoum.

What is their medical condition?

Mr. **Winter**. First of all, these are people who have come in over a period of time. They are people who are in normally very bad shape when they finish the trek from their home territory in the south to these locations in the north.

You may recall, when the floods occurred in August, these were the people who had occupied the squatter ground, the low-lying ground. When the floods hit, not only did they not have much before they hit, but they had even less afterward. They were the biggest sufferers in this.

There has been very little in the way of supplies or relief made available to these people. The government has not gone out of its way at all to try to meet their needs or facilitate relief supplies being made available.

Many of these people are encamped on a garbage dump. Their situation is one of perpetual penury and misery and ill-health and poor nutrition.

It is not that they can't be reached. Obviously, they are there. They are in and around Khartoum.

It is not that resources are not available. They certainly can be made available. I am quite confident that my U.S. Government colleagues behind me would be more than happy to see much of their resources be invested on behalf of these people.

Clearly, over time, this population has been shown to be a bellwether about how the government views displaced southern civilians.

Senator HUMPHREY. There is widespread malnutrition among this million and a half?

Mr. WINTER. I don't know the statistics on this group.

There have been Centers for Disease Control teams over there, and others. It may be that in the next portion of your hearing, you will be able to get those exact statistics. I do not have them.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you know about that, Mr. Prendergast?

Mr. PRENDERGAST. The Khartoum government would not give me a visa to go to Khartoum.

But we can get figures for you because I know they exist. But I don't know the exact numbers.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you.

[The information referred to follows:]

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20523

Note: updated information
is underlined

Situation Report No. 16
February 22, 1989
5:00 p.m.

SUDAN - Civil Strife/Displaced Persons

Date: Civil strife has been ongoing for several years

Areas Affected: Civil strife throughout southern Sudan
Displaced persons in Khartoum area, Southern Darfur, Southern Kordofan, southern Sudan, and the White and Blue Nile provinces

Summary of USG Assistance (Since February 1988)

Total OFDA contribution	$5,823,912
Total FFP contribution	$43,180,500
Total RP contribution	$12,500,000
TOTAL USG contribution	$61,504,412

Displaced person (DP) populations:

South Kordofan:	
Abyei	30,000
Babanusa	5,000
El Gantur	1,000
El Meiram	14,000
El Tibum	3,000
Kadugli	4,500
Muglad	7,000
SUBTOTAL	64,500

Central Provinces:	
Kosti	60,000
Damazin	34,500
W. Medani	8,000
Sennar	7,000
SUBTOTAL	109,500

Southern Darfur: 17,000

Bahr El Ghazal:	
Aweil	31,000
Wau	28,000
Raga	20,000
SUBTOTAL	79,000

Equatoria:	
Juba	148,000
Torit	5,000
Yei	60,000
SUBTOTAL	213,000

Upper Nile	
Malakal	60,000
Renk	40,000
SUBTOTAL	100,000

Khartoum: 600,000

GRAND TOTAL 1,183,000

- Besides the more than a million displaced within Sudan, the strife has also forced many southerners to seek refuge in neighboring countries. Refugee estimates are as follows: Ethiopia hosts 350,000, Uganda 2,000, and the Central African Republic has several hundred Sudanese refugees.

Summary

- Conflict between the rebel forces of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Government of Sudan (GOS) in the south has forced many southerners to flee to Khartoum, Southern Darfur and Kordofan provinces, northern Bahr El Ghazal, the central Nile region, and neighboring countries. Fragile road and train infrastructure has been unable to ship adequate relief food to towns cut off during the rainy season (April - July). Civil strife has also greatly hampered relief shipments into the south. Major food relief transportation routes have included: airlifts to Juba from Nairobi (Kenya), Entebbe (Uganda), and Khartoum; airlifts and truck transport to Abyei from Muglad and Kosti; truck convoys to Yei and Juba from Kenya and Uganda; convoys to Wau from the south, from Raga and cities to the north; trains from Kosti to Babanusa, El Meiram, Aweil and Wau; and barges to Malakal from Kosti.

The South

- Since October, donors have been able to transport relief food to Juba solely through airlifts. The U.N. World Food Program (WFP) airlifted a total of 1,700 MT from Entebbe, Uganda, before operations were suspended. WFP is currently trying to reestablish a land route from Kenya, through Uganda, to Yei and Juba. Due to insecurity in Equatoria and northern Uganda, overland transport of relief food remains tenuous.

- Lutheran World Federation (LWF) and the EC have been flying food to Juba from Nairobi and Khartoum. As of Feb. 10, the EC had airlifted 1,000 MT of dura to Juba from Khartoum. LWF flights from Nairobi continue regularly.

- A train convoy carrying 980 MT of dura provided by the U.S. and the E.C., and 20 MT of UNIMIX donated by WFP and UNICEF arrived in Aweil on Jan. 16. This shipment represents the most significant amount of relief foods received by Aweil in two years. When the rainy season commences in April or May, tens of thousands of displaced southerners are expected to migrate to Aweil in search of food. Because of the urgent need to move food to Aweil, donors are funding a number of projects designed to preposition food in or near Aweil.

- OFDA will sponsor airlifts to Aweil from prepositioned stocks in Abyei and Muglad. These operations, due to begin March 1, will deliver an initial 1,000 MT of relief food to Aweil. Given the security situation around Aweil, options for overland transport of relief goods are very limited. It is unlikely that Aweil's food requirements can be met prior to the rainy season without an open roads policy and/or the immediate availability of overland transport of relief commodities via the railroad.

- Wau, like Aweil, has received very little food in the last few years. MSF/Holland has received permission to begin operations in Wau and will cooperate closely with the ICRC. At this time, the only relief food reaching the city is being delivered on the ICRC's C-130. However, efforts are being made by other donors to truck food to Wau from Raga.

- A barge convoy, including 14 barges with 5,660 MT of relief goods, arrived in Malakal on Feb. 16, 1989. The last significant amount of relief food into Malakal was on the last barge convoy in March 1988.

- The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which has been negotiating to supply relief to towns on both sides of the conflict, began ferrying urgently needed food and medical supplies into southern Sudan on Dec. 4, 1988. ICRC-chartered planes shuttle food, relief supplies, and personnel daily to Wau (GOS-held) and Akon (SPLA-held). Flights have been stepped up to transport relief goods to Aweil (GOS-held) and Yirol (SPLA-held). The ICRC has gained permission from both sides of the conflict to expand its relief operations to additional towns in the south.

Southern Kordofan

- Abyei: Considerable progress has been made in alleviating the situation in Abyei. A.I.D.-chartered Nile Safaris aircraft ferried in 90 MT of sorghum from Oct. 13 to Oct. 24, and a C-130 provided by the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (LRCS) airlifted 500 MT of U.S.-provided sorghum from El Obeid to Abyei. Irish Concern sent a caravan of over 100 donkeys carrying about 8 MT of sorghum from Muglad to Abyei. USAID has begun to move by truck an additional 5,000 MT of food targeted for Abyei. An escorted truck convoy carrying 500 MT of relief food reached Abyei in January, 1989. The number of displaced is increasing and is expected to reach 50,000 before the rainy season.

- Kadugli: Action Internationale Contre la Faim (AICF), a French group, gained permission from the Sudanese government to resume relief activities in Kadugli. It is assisting the displaced with health needs and has distributed USAID grain.

- Muglad: Relief efforts in Southern Kordofan are coordinated primarily out of Muglad under the management of Sudan's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission and CONCERN (Ireland). USAID is moving to preposition a total of 13,000 MT of food to transshipment and storage sites in Southern Kordofan and Bahr El Ghazal before the rainy season. USAID relief food has begun to arrive at storage sites in Muglad.

Actions Taken by the Government of Sudan (GOS) and Sudanese Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

- The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) is the national coordinating organization for emergency relief programs. The Coordinator of the RRC is also chairman of the Technical Coordination Committee (TCC), which comprises NGOs, donors, and the GOS, and meets weekly to review the aid situation and problems in the south and west.

- The RRC is finalizing its estimate of needs for the next several months for the towns in Southern Kordofan Province which have significant displaced populations. Donors will then be asked to pledge toward those needs and efforts will begin to preposition food stocks prior to this year's rainy season.

- Local relief committees are active in each of the affected southern provinces. The Combined Agencies Relief Team (CART) distributes food, seeds, and tools to the needy in and around Juba. The members of CART are: Sudanaid, the Episcopal Church of Sudan (ECS), the Islamic African Relief Agency (IARA), the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC), the Diocese of Juba, the Diocese of Torit, Oxfam/U.K., and Norwegian Church Aid (NCA). Sudanaid and SCC also have programs in Upper Nile and Bahr El Ghazal provinces, and in the capital city of Khartoum.

- The Sudanese Red Crescent (SRC), in cooperation with the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (LRCS), heads a consortium of NGOs (including Oxfam/U.K., Save the Children/U.K., MSF/Belgium, and Irish Concern) which provides relief in Southern Kordofan and assists in food distributions to displaced persons in the province.

Assistance Provided by the U.S. Government (USG)

- On Feb. 28, 1988, U.S. Ambassador G. Norman Anderson declared a disaster due to the civil strife in the south and drought in the west. On Nov. 25, he redeclared a disaster for civil strife. The following support has been provided for the civil strife emergency:

OFDA Assistance

- The following funds were expended between Feb.-Sept. 1988:

Grant to Sudanaid	$ 25,000
Grant to Church World Service (CWS) to move and monitor 2,500 MT of food in the south	$ 42,670
700 rolls of plastic sheeting for DPs in Khartoum	$224,850
DOD transport of plastic sheeting and forklift rental	$147,400
TOTAL	$439,920

- OFDA has been sending disaster operational teams to Sudan since late September to plan and implement relief activities for the displaced southerners. The first team remained in Khartoum from Sept. 27 - Nov. 1 and cost OFDA $34,260. Subsequent follow-on teams have been largely financed from Mission funds. In addition, OFDA obligated $15,000 to hire survey aircraft for assessments of affected areas led by the operational teams.

- OFDA gave $1,500,000 to the RRC to support relief efforts. Activities funded under the grant are as follows:

Use of 2 AirServ Twin Otter for relief flights to Aweil	1,162,140
Support of train transport to Aweil	$165,165
Vehicles for the RRC	$135,000
Use of Sudanese Airforce Buffalo aircraft (reserved)	$35,000
Unallocated	$2,695
TOTAL	$1,500,000

- In addition to activities funded under the RRC grant, OFDA also approved the following expenditures:

1) Marine radios and tugboat parts to expedite barge delivery of supplies to Malakal	$48,030
2) Radio communications network to link Khartoum with relief organizations working in El Obeid, Muglad, Babanusa, Kadugli, El Meiram, Aweil, and Abyei	$36,085
3)Technical assistance (Don Smith) to assist with communications system	$15,611
4) Grant to the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (LRCS)/NGO consortium (signed Dec. 6)	$1,750,000
5) Grant to UNICEF for provision of drugs, medical supplies, and water supply in Southern Kordofan (signed Jan. 26)	$310,006
6) Grant to CRS for WFP airlifts to Juba	$300,000
7) Airlift of 552 parachutes (donated by DOD) for NCA Torit airdrop	$125,000
8) Use of Dash-7 for relief of Aweil	$750,000
9) Grant to LWF for airlifts to Juba	$500,000
TOTAL	$3,834,732

Food for Peace Assistance

- A.I.D.'s Office for Food for Peace (FFP) has provided the following Title II emergency food: 4,000 MT maize and beans (through a wheat swap with Kenya); 25,000 MT Sudanese dura (through a wheat swap with the GOS); 25,000 MT sorghum; and 1,353 MT of instant corn-soya milk (ICSM).

- Three additional allocations have been approved over the last two months: (1) a wheat swap for 50,000 MT Sudanese dura; and (2) a new wheat swap with Kenya for 16,000 MT; and (3) 19,810 MT of supplementary foods.

  Total food made available............................141,163 MT
  Total cost of the food and transportation (est.).....$43,180,500

The Department of State Bureau for Refugee Programs (RP)

- In 1988, the U.S. provided approximately 25% and 20% respectively of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and ICRC African assistance programs, including those for Sudanese refugees and displaced persons. UNHCR's 1988 program budget for Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia reached $30 million. ICRC's 1988 program budget for Sudan was about $10 million. The U.S. provided earmarked contributions of $12.5 million for Sudanese and Somali refugees in Ethiopia in 1988.

- For 1989, RP anticipates providing at least 20% and 10% respectively for UNHCR and ICRC African assistance programs. UNHCR's 1989 program budget for Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia is $23 million. ICRC's current 1989 program budget for Sudan is some $37 million. RP has already contributed $3 million to the ICRC specifically for airlift operations in southern Sudan.

- USG refugee assistance (earmarked and unearmarked) for Sudanese has therefore reached at least $12.5 million since February 1988.

Total RP contribution...$12,500,000

Summary of USG Assistance

Total OFDA contribution	$5,823,912
Total FFP contribution	$43,180,500
Total RP contribution	$12,500,000
Total USG contribution	$61,504,412

Assistance Provided by U.S. Private Voluntary Agencies

- AmeriCares - works through Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) and Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) to assist the displaced in southern Sudan.

- American Red Cross (ARC) - provided personnel, supplies, and financial support to the LRCS and the ICRC working with the displaced in Sudan.

- Care - Care is managing the transport and delivery of 63,000 MT of sorghum (50,000 of which is from USAID) to relief agencies feeding DP population north of the conflict zone. Care is also helping in the prepositioning and monitoring of critical relief supplies such as temporary shelter, clothes, and blankets in El Obeid and En Nahud in anticipation of future influxes of DP populations. Finally, Care is providing relief assistance in camps around En Nahud, where it distributes food, relief supplies, and water to 7,000 DPs in camps outside of the town.

- Catholic Relief Services (CRS) - donated 1,000 MT of food for the WFP Entebbe-Juba airlift and covered some of the associated transportation costs. CRS channels money through Sudanaid for relief assistance to the displaced in Juba.
- Church World Service (CWS) and Lutheran World Relief (LWR) - work through SCC to assist displaced persons in southern Sudan.

- World Vision Relief and Development (WVRD) - donated 14 MT of cooking oil, 42 MT of UNIMIX, and 4 MT of medicine and medical supplies for an airlift from Nairobi to Juba organized by Lutheran World Federation (LWF). WVRD is supplying 20 MT of UNIMIX (valued at $15,000) through MSF/Holland for distribution by the Episcopal Church of Sudan to the displaced in Yei.

Assistance Provided by the International Community

- The EC is a major donor, providing aid in all affected provinces in the south and in Kordofan and Darfur. It funded the airlift of 1,000 MT of wheat from Port Sudan to Juba and an airlift of 1,000 MT of sorghum from Khartoum to Juba, which was completed in January.

- Band Aid and Goal (Ireland) donated 1,000,000 Sudanese pounds through Sudanaid to the Catholic bishop in Wau for the local purchase of relief food and logistical support.

- International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is conducting relief operations in southern Sudan.

- Iraq donated 58 MT of relief food for Juba.

- Italy arranged a rice-maize swap with the Government fo Kenya for up to 10,000 MT of maize for southern Sudan.

- Lutheran World Federation (LWF) provided funding for a C-130 to airlift food and medicine from Nairobi to Juba.

- The Netherlands is funding MALT, the management and logistics arm of the RRC. It also gave $1,533,100 through the ICRC for relief operations in the south.
- Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) organized an airdrop of food to Torit (using USAID-provided parachutes).
- National Red Cross Societies of the following countries gave through the ICRC: Austria ($20,700), Canada ($21,000), Japan ($61,000), and Liechtenstein ($15,600).
- Switzerland gave $565,500 through the ICRC.
- UNICEF carries out vaccination campaigns in the DP camps in the Juba area. It also assists with health and water needs in Southern Kordofan.
- The United Kingdom financed the purchase and airlift of 400 MT of grain from Khartoum to Juba. It also donated 13,000 MT of food for distribution through relief agencies in the North.
- WFP channels international food donations to southern Sudan, primarily Juba and Yei, and provides the services of an operations manager to coordinate emergency food aid to Kordofan and Darfur. WFP has sponsored airlifts which have carried 3,700 MT of food from Entebbe to Juba.
- NGOs working with the displaced or in the south include Oxfam/U.K., SCF/U.K., CONCERN (Ireland) MSF/France, MSF/Holland, MSF/Belgium, AICF (France), Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), and Goal (Ireland).

Julia V. Taft
Director
Office of U.S. Foreign
Disaster Assistance

Senator HUMPHREY. Are they getting any assistance at all from the Khartoum government?

Mr. WINTER. I am not aware of any meaningful assistance. There have been some small NGO programs. There have been some efforts that I am aware of on the part of U.S. authorities to try to stimulate programs. But I am not aware of anything that is more than negligible at this point in time.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, how are they surviving? What do they eat?

Mr. WINTER. Well, you know, some do and some do not. Some do regularly, and some do not regularly.

Most of these people have arrived without resources. Most of them are not in a position to work—not that there is that much work available for them.

Because of who they are, they are not a particularly trusted population. To some degree, they are viewed as a potential fifth column within their own country's capital.

They are in desperate straits.

Senator HUMPHREY. Are they isolated or permitted to mix with the locals and work in the economy, where possible?

Mr. WINTER. Some obviously work, but what the numbers are, I simply do not know.

Senator HUMPHREY. What I am trying to gauge is the severity of the crisis with respect to this group, which, as you point out, is a bellwether group and one which can be easily assisted.

Mr. WINTER. I happen to think it is quite severe, and that severity is magnified by the fact that it is logistically remediable and has not been.

May I point out something for the record?

Ken Brown advises me that an AID officer has been in Kapoeta, and, therefore, when ~~I~~ said no U.S. Government official has set foot in SPLA-held territory~~,~~ he advises me that I am incorrect.

Senator HUMPHREY. May I continue, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SIMON. Yes, continue with your questions.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Winter, what leverage exists for the U.S. Government to secure greater cooperation on the part of both parties to this war?

Mr. WINTER. Well, my sense of the situation is that things are in a state of flux right now in a whole variety of directions.

U.S. policy has been clearer, more articulated, is more evenhanded, and I truly believe that the pressures from the United States, potentially also from others in the diplomatic community, and from the peace movement within Khartoum itself hold at least the possibility of pressing that government toward a more positive response to the DUP-SPLA peace initiative.

The problem is to some degree Sadiq has himself in a corner. He has identified himself with the Islamic fundamentalists. He has actually gone in the direction closer to that group and closer to Libya, which is exactly what I believe United States policy was seeking to forestall.

So, to me, we, at this point, have nothing to lose by being straightforward and right on, and insisting that humanitarian initiatives necessary to respond to this population be put in place and that the peace process move forward.

Whether or not we have all of the tools we need to pull it off is perhaps not yet the question. The question is have we used all the tools we have at hand.

Certainly we have not used some of the tools that John has enumerated here. We have not used our clout through multilateral lending institutions and others yet, at least to the degree that I think we should.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you agree with Mr. Prendergast that we ought to condition U.S. assistance and work for conditioning multilateral assistance on steps to aid those in need?

Mr. WINTER. Absolutely.

We should not be hiding—that is not a correct word. We should not be overromanticizing the fact that there is a democratic tradition in Sudan if that government treats its own civilians the way this government is treating them.

Certainly we should be prepared to act in a different fashion.

Senator **HUMPHREY**. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **SIMON**. We thank you both.

Let me just add that we have a statement from the American Council for Voluntary International Action that will be entered in the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

INTERACTION,
February 22, 1989.

Hon. PAUL SIMON, *Chairman,*
Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC 20510

DEAR SENATOR SIMON: We are pleased that the crisis in the Sudan will be the subject of hearings this week.

Attached please find a letter which 20 member agencies of InterAction sent to each Member of Congress last month. A similar letter went to the Secretary of State.

The letter urges stepped up action on the diplomatic front to end the civil war and on the humanitarian front to reach people in desperate need with relief supplies.

We would be pleased to have the letter circulated among the subcommittee and included in the hearing record.

Sincerely,

PETER J. DAVIES,
President and Chief Executive Officer.

INTERACTION,
January 20, 1989.

DEAR MEMBER OF CONGRESS: We, the undersigned member agencies of InterAction, are writing to call your attention to the grave humanitarian crisis in the Sudan, where in 1988 alone an estimated 260,000 persons died of hunger. Accelerated action is needed to avert a situation potentially more catastrophic than Ethiopia's in 1984-85.

Faced with the earlier crisis in Ethiopia and other African countries, the newly elected 99th Congress moved quickly to enact legislation, signed by President Reagan April 4, 1985, which provided stepped up U.S. aid. The current situation, we believe, requires action at an even more accelerated pace.

There have been some encouraging developments since the 100th Congress adjourned last year. While a cease-fire remains elusive, more relief supplies are now reaching those in desperate need. There is also increased awareness about the crisis, thanks in part to recent visits by Members of Congress and congressional staff.

Progress notwithstanding, the plight of several million civilians displaced within the Sudan and in refuge in neighboring countries remains perilous. Only a few short months remain before the rainy season will make relief operations vastly more difficult and expensive. Accelerated efforts to relieve the suffering and halt the bloodshed are thus necessary.

We are therefore writing the new administration to urge a major U.S. diplomatic initiative to end the fighting and provide additional urgently needed humanitarian aid. Our recommendations are attached. While the focus is now on executive branch action, we ask that the new Congress be prepared to provide moral, political, legislative, and financial support in the months ahead.

The Sudan tragedy challenges our Nation and the international community. Decisive action will embody humanitarian values and traditions cherished by, and reflective of, the American people.

Sincerely,

NORMAN E. BARTH, *Executive Director, Lutheran World Relief;* JAMES J. BAUSCH, *President, Save the Children Federation;* ANN N. BEARDSLEE, *Executive Director, Church World Service;* DONALD BJORK, *Associate Executive Director, World Relief;* E. TIMOTHY CARROLL, *Executive Di-*

rector, National Council of Returned Peace Corps Volunteers; W. EUGENE GRUBBS, *Executive Director, Interchurch Medical Assistance;* JOHN C. HAMMOCK, *Executive Director, Oxfam America;* PHILIP JOHNSTON, *Executive Director, CARE;* ANDREW J. KOVAL, *Executive Director, Council for International Development;* JOHN A. LAPP, *Executive Secretary, Mennonite Central Committee;* MARIANNE LOEWE, *Executive Director, Concern America;* C. PAYNE LUCAS, *Executive Director, Africare;* CHARLES MACCORMACK, *President, Experiment in International Living;* LEON MARION, *Executive Director, Tolstoy Foundation;* RICHARD S. SCOBIE, *Executive Director, Unitarian Universalist Service Committee;* HENRY SJARDEMA, *Chief Executive Officer, Project Concern International;* PAUL B. THOMPSON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, WORLD VISION; KENNETH TULL, *Executive Director, Rodale International;* RICHARD WALDEN, *Executive Director, Operation California;* and ROGER WINTER, *Executive Director, U.S. Committee for Refugees.*

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTION

1. The United States should actively promote international diplomatic efforts to hasten a cease-fire, assure safe passage of relief supplies, and encourage a durable peace agreement in the Sudan.
2. The United States should substantially increase its relief aid, utilizing Government, United Nations, and private voluntary organization channels. Of particular concern are the needs of civilians in the south outside areas of government control, for whom an expanded cross-border operation from neighboring countries is needed. The United States should also encourage the Sudan Government to step up efforts to assist the hundreds of thousands of southerners displaced to the north whose critical needs remain largely unmet.
3. The United States should encourage the Sudan Government to take specific steps to regain control of the undisciplined tribal militias it has armed in the north and south which are responsible for considerable violence against civilians.
4. The United States should commit itself to play a major role in an international efforts to assist in the reconstruction and development of the southern Sudan as soon as the political and security situation warrants.
5. Building on the easing of tensions in other regional trouble spots in recent months, the United States should encourage and work with governments and other parties to the conflicts in the Horn of Africa to seek negotiated settlements.
6. The United States should call on the United Nations Secretary General to designate a special emissary to coordinate international relief efforts and facilitate peace initiatives throughout the region. The administration should also designate a high-level American official to spearhead U.S. efforts to ease hunger and end the bloodshed there.

Senator SIMON. We now will move into a closed portion and go into the back room for that.

Those who have been invited as witnesses for that closed portion know who they are. If you will, please step into the back room.

[Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in closed session.]

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES A. BAKER III

The United States Government remains profoundly concerned about massive human suffering in Sudan. The cause if the civil war, now in its sixth year. Most of the war's victims are civilians who are displaced and impoverished or who starve to death for lack of delivery of available food. The death toll from starvation in 1988 alone is estimated to range in the hundreds of thousands.

Many Sudanese and expatriates are laboring tirelessly to ensure food deliveries, and the cooperation with these efforts by both the Sudanese Government and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) has improved in recent months. But much more needs to be done. We call on authorities at all levels on both sides to remove remaining obstacles and do everything possible to provide emergency relief to victims caught in garrison towns and other areas of the war zone. Failure to do so will mean that thousands more will die in the coming rainy season. The United States will do all it can to support this effort. We call on other donors also to undertake or expand relief efforts.

The sad reality, however, is that starvation will almost certainly not end until the fighting ends. As friends of Sudan we urge the Sudanese Government and the SPLA to put peace first and to agree to an early cease-fire which would promote that goal and allow relief to reach those in need.

THE U.S. AND SUDAN: PEACE AND RELIEF

Sudan is an important country afflicted by years of civil war, economic disorder, and famine. The scale of suffering is so large that causes of the war and goals of the combatants have become of secondary importance. The United States believes that no issue is as urgent as providing food to the innocent victims of this conflict. But we recognize that the famine is the direct result of the war. The achievement of peace is the real answer to the suffering and human tragedy in Sudan. Hence, our central objective is to end the war.

Sudan's problems have brought it to the world's attention. The urgency for the United States is heightened by our long ties of friendship with Sudan, our support for its democratic institutions, and the importance of its stability for the region. Our policy thus is centered on interrelated issues: support for Sudan's democracy, a peaceful solution to the war, and relief for its victims.

FAMINE AND RELIEF

Delivery of relief rather than the availability of supplies has been the major problem facing relief efforts. Relief programs are maddeningly hard to implement in the vastness of southern Sudan, an area the size of France. Deaths related to famine during the past year are impossible to count, but estimates range into the hundreds of thousands. Perhaps over 2 million southern Sudanese have fled to the north or to Ethiopia to escape the fighting and hunger. Inefficiency and opposition by elements on both sides have sometimes hindered delivery of relief. Even without a war, any relief effort would be severely complicated by the inhospitable terrain, bandits, and the pervasive lack of reliable information on population concentrations and need. The few existing tracks or roads are mined or otherwise contested by combatants, many of whom are out of touch with any authority.

Despite these obstacles, there is progress on relief and the United States has been in the forefront of efforts to provide it. The current International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) program to deliver food to noncombatants on both sides in the war zone is largely a U.S. initiative and was accepted by both sides in part as a result of strong U.S. leadership and encouragement. Since both sides harbor suspicions about the purpose and use of food, the ICRC's participation has been essential. It is experienced in working with adversaries in conducting relief activities across battle lines and in guaranteeing that food reaches noncombatants. Deliveries began in December 1988 to the government-held towns of Wau and Aweil and the SPLA-held towns of Akon and Yirol.

While the ICRC role is crucial, it is not the only available instrument for relief. We have been actively soliciting proposals from private voluntary organizations which might be interested in carrying out relief efforts on both sides of the war zone. As early as 1986, the United States opened discussions with the Sudanese Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), the relief arm of the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), to review the possibility of American PVO's providing assistance into the south. While the SRRA agreed in principle to such assistance, no established PVO'S were willing to undertake relief operations in the circumstances which existed at that time.

One serious constraint continues to be lack of reliable information on needs in areas controlled by the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA—SPLM military wing) and the hesitancy of organizations to begin operations without a better understanding of needs and the security situation. While information and appropriate responses for those areas are being developed, the U.S. Government is emphasizing relief efforts targeted on government-controlled garrison towns in the south (which have the largest identifiable populations of displaced persons in the war zone), and accessible areas outside the war zone in which large numbers of displaced persons have gathered. These include southern Darfur, southern Kordofan, Khartoum, and the Nile regions.

The United States has been a leading contributor to multilateral relief operations in Sudan. Concerned that relief be gotten into the war zone to government-controlled towns where clear needs were developing, United States officials opened discussions with the Sudanese Government and SPLA on a possible ICRC program in November 1987. Although the United States had been providing as much assistance as possible to southern Sudan, first signs of famine in SPLA-controlled territory appeared in spring 1988, when some 300,000 Sudanese refugees crossed into Ethiopia and were settled in U.N. camps. The dimensions of the famine became clearer by summer when an estimated 200,000 war victims began to gather north of the war zone. The war, logistical difficulties, and flooding impeded relief operations until a U.S.-financed airlift was initiated in September. By year's end, overland routes, again subject to SPLA attacks, were just beginning to open up. During the past 2 years, the U.S. Ambassador has declared 10 disasters in Sudan and more than $60 million has been spent on relief. This includes about $30 million during the past 6 months channeled through the ICRC, bilateral programs, and PVO's as floodwaters receded and the extent of needs was identified.

THE WAR AND ITS RESOLUTION

Causes of the conflict in Sudan are exceedingly complex. Sudan is both Islamic and Christian, African and Arab. The civil war turns on questions of national identity and the nature of the Sudanese state. Generalizations can be misleading. Not all northerners want Sharia law and an Islamic state. Not all southerners support armed rebellion. Both sides are asserting deeply held values. Thus, ending the war while supporting democracy has proven to be an elusive objective. But the tragedy will be prolonged and enormous if the solution is found on the battlefield rather than at the bargaining table.

The United States has also taken a leading role in promoting a negotiated settlement. Intensive efforts throughout 1988, including those by the United States, unfortunately did not succeed in bringing Prime Minister Sadiq and SPLA leader John Garang together. But many contacts at other levels between the sides helped prepare the way for productive talks which took place in Addis in November between Sudan's Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)—one of three principal northern political parties—and SPLA representatives. The DUP/SPLA proposal contained the key elements of compromise which would halt the fighting and permit both sides to join in a constitutional convention for discussion of the issues separating them and leading to a new constitution for Sudan.

Ethiopian support and sanctuary for the SPLA have been essential for the SPLA. The United States has taken the initiative in discussing Ethiopia's policies and role with the Soviets. We will continue to seek an end to external interference in Sudan and progress with the Soviets in pursuit of negotiated solutions to these regional problems. The United States believes, however, that Sudan's civil war involves fundamental internal issues and grievances which Sudanese themselves must resolve.

Based on the stated positions of both sides, resolution of the issues should not be impossible. The SPLA does not propose secession, but insists that the south share economic wealth and political power on a negotiated basis. The Prime Minister and his government agree. The sticking point is the country's legal system. The SPLA and most southerners do not agree that Islamic law, Sharia, should be applied in the non-Moslem south or that non-Moslems living in the north should be subject to it. Much less, in the southerners' view, should it be the basis of the constitution. Northern parties are divided on these points, although the extent of differences and whether they are bridgeable is not clear. No party, however, has said it opposes discussion of Islamic law in the context of a constitutional convention of all Sudanese parties.

Despite the promise of the DUP/SPLA peace proposal, the government has not brought about agreement of the Constituent Assembly and Cabinet, which could lead to implementation of the proposal. The United States supports all three fundamental elements of the DUP/SPLA peace proposal: a constitutional convention to bring the parties together; no preemptive moves to revise or implement Sharia laws pending the conference; and a cease-fire demonstrating the good will of both sides to engage in productive talks.

Of these considerations, a cease-fire which is necessary for getting relief to all those in need, is most urgent.

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